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This is Part III of a three-part series known as “The Dark Side of Due Process”
published in The St. Mary’s Law Journal. Parts I and II precede this Article in
consecutive issues of this volume at The St. Mary’s Law Journal. An Abstract and
Foreword for this project are printed at the beginning of Part I, and a general conclusion
is printed at the end of Part III.
INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEM OF DUPLICITY IN
LEGAL THOUGHT AND SPEECH
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. and Ralph Waldo Emerson proved
that Thomas Hobbes’s factions of American Hegelians were as sanguine as
French Terroristes were about rationalizing human cruelty.1 We have several
theories of dual consciousness that owe their existence to these Hegelians.2
Pro-cruelty, dual-consciousness rationalisms persisted as an explanation, but

1. Compare BERTRAND RUSSELL, A HISTORY OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY 738–41 (1945)
[hereinafter RUSSELL, A HISTORY] (explaining Hegel’s celebration of Hobbesian violence and cruelty),
with Oliver Wendell Holmes, Natural Law, 32 HARV. L. REV. 40, 42 (1918) [hereinafter Holmes, Natural
Law] (presenting preexisting natural rights as a mere struggle for survival stating: “A dog will fight for
his bone.”), Oliver Wendell Holmes, Law in Science and Science in Law, 12 HARV. L. REV. 443, 449 (1899)
[hereinafter Holmes, Law in Science] (presenting judicial lawmaking as a violent “struggle for life among
competing ideas, and of the ultimate victory and survival of the strongest”), and RALPH WALDO
EMERSON, ESSAYS: SECOND SERIES 175 (1845) (imagining the ideal Christmas gift, Emerson wrote:
“Rings and other jewels are not gifts, but apologies for gifts. The only gift is a portion of thyself. Thou
must bleed for me.”) (emphasis added); cf. James A. Good, A “World-Historical Idea”: The St. Louis Hegelians
and the Civil War, 34 J. AM. STUDIES 447, 451–53 (2000) (noting that the violence that occurred in
Missouri during the Civil War “led the St. Louis Hegelians to conclude that they had witnessed a
necessary moment in Hegel’s ‘slaughter-bench’ of history.”).
2. Joel Porte, Emerson, Thoreau, and the Double Consciousness, 41 NEW ENGLAND Q. 40, 42 (1968);
Sheldon M. Novick, Justice Holmes’ Philosophy, 70 WASH. U. L. REV. 703, 706, 722 (1992) (noting how
Holmes was strongly “influenced by Hegel”); SANDRA ADELL, DOUBLE-CONSCIOUSNESS/DOUBLE
BIND 13–15 (1994), explaining W.E.B. DUBOIS, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK 8–9 (Brent Hayes
Edwards ed., 2007) (putting forth a well-known theory of “double-consciousness” from the African
American perspective, and desiring Hegelian aufebung and sublation here: “The history of the American
Negro is the history of strife,—this longing to attain self-conscious manhood, to merge his double self
into a better and truer self. In this merging he wishes neither of the older selves to be lost.”), also
examined in IBRAM X. KENDI, HOW TO BE AN ANTIRACIST 28–30 (2019), and in REGINALD A.
WILBURN, PREACHING THE GOSPEL OF BLACK REVOLT 20–21, 171–72 (2014) (identifying Milton as
the origin of Black ideas of revolt and revolution in America, especially pointing to Milton’s terroristic
tract Samson Agonistes); see THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 46–48 (A. R. Waller ed., 1904) (asserting
inherent human insanity because of the duality of human pride and dejection), exemplified in John
Milton, Samson Agonistes 532–40 [1671]; see also Christopher N. Warren, When Self-Preservation Bids:
Approaching Milton, Hobbes, and Dissent, 37 ENG. LIT. RENAISSANCE 118, 119–20, 130, 139 (2007); cf.
Good, supra note 1, at 448 (noting Emerson’s strong interest in Hegelianism); BERTRAND RUSSELL,
UNPOPULAR ESSAYS 20 (1995) [hereinafter RUSSELL, UNPOPULAR].
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not an excuse, when Donald Trump’s irreverence was embraced by the
evangelicals in 2016.3
Hobbesian cognitive dissonance exemplified by the paradoxical
experience of the human emotions of pride and dejection,4 in line with the
poetry of John Donne,5 is as real as it is alarming.6 Hobbes’s bastardized
version of virtue ethics descended from the philosophies of Saint Thomas
Aquinas and Aristotle.7 However, Hobbes was the first to idealize vices as
perfect and thus correct, while dismissing virtues as imperfect,
disappointing, and thus incorrect and improper.8
3. Eddle Harmon-Jones, Dissonance and the President: How Supporters of the Current President Continue
to Support Him., PSYCH. TODAY (Aug. 27, 2020), https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/
blog/the-social-emotional-brain/202008/dissonance-and-the-president
[https://perma.cc/R98ZYSZA] (explaining how Christian supporters of Trump continue to do so through “cognitive
dissonance”). Compare RUSSELL, A HISTORY, supra note 1, at 733–40 (explaining the Hegelian way of
double-thinking and Hegel’s celebration of violence and cruelty as a necessary component of statecraft,
and clarifying that Hegel’s vision of the ideal “free” society was a monarchy where several people are
enslaved, impoverished, and abused), RUSSELL, UNPOPULAR, supra note 2, at 122–23, HOBBES, supra
note 2, at 46–48, exemplified in John Milton, Samson Agonistes 1639–68 [1671] (defining suicide-as-selfsacrifice, i.e., as an expression of selfishness-made-virtue, based in Christianity, that suffers the ironies
of being Hobbesian, materialist, and potentially, anti-Christ); and WILBURN, supra note 2, at 20
(examining Milton’s influence over calls to violence in America), with The Family: Wolf King 27:18
(Netflix 2019) (presenting a way of religious thinking that Evangelicals use to support Trump as a form
of virtuous self-sacrifice for the greater good, while knowing Trump is a bad man that is certainly in
the service of their enemies).
4. HOBBES, supra note 2, at 46–48.
5. John Donne, Holy Sonnet XIV [1633] (arguing that religious purity can be gained through
violence and abuse); cf. WIT (Avenue Pictures 2001) (explaining Donne’s contributions to the English
literature, especially his use of the literary device known as a conceit).
6. The Family: Wolf King 27:18 (Netflix 2019).
7. See HOBBES, supra note 2, at 46–48 (describing how the human vices of pride and dejection
worked to drive humanity so insane that they would disregard their preexisting rights and lift absolute
kings into power); id. at 109 (criticizing “the Writers of Morall Philosophie” including Aristotle and
Aquinas for presuming that their virtues are apparent with uniformity to all people through natural
reason by which “private Appetite is the measure of Good, and Evill” that causes “Disputes,
Controversies, and at last War,” which Hobbes defines as “the condition of meer nature”); ST. THOMAS
AQUINAS, SUMMA OF THE SUMMA 16 (Peter Kreeft ed., 1990); Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 43–49; cf.
Robert Arp, The Quinque Viae of Thomas Hobbes, 16 HIST. PHIL. Q. 367, 368 (1999) (quoting THOMAS
HOBBES & JOHN BRAMHALL, QUESTIONS CONCERNING LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE 48
(1656)) (“Aquinas himself is mentioned in Hobbes’s works. It is noted by Hobbes that Luther mentions
Aquinas as the one who ‘set up the kingdom of Aristotle, the destroyer of Godly doctrine’ . . . .”
(citation omitted)).
8. See, e.g., HOBBES, supra note 2, at 21, 46–48 (stating that the language of virtues and vices is
relative and “therefore . . . can never be true grounds of any ratiocination”); id. at 62 (positing his theory
that felicity consists in prospering, not in having prospered as a replacement for virtue theory).
Hobbesian vice-as-ideal could be seen as an attempt by Hobbes to besmirch Aristotle’s virtue known
as “magnanimity,” which is sometimes translated as “pride.” Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 66–67;
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Hobbes’s novel theory that the perfection of government through vice is
preferable to an imperfect, virtue driven government was premised on the
theory that the virtue of humility is futile.9 The best exemplar of this
overlooked virtue in America was the marvelous revolutionary poet, Phillis
Wheatley.10 As a leader of American revolutionary forces, Wheatley
countenanced Christianity’s anticipation of Hobbes’s abuse of the duality in
human nature by writing a glowing review of the sermons of the English
Reverend Thomas Amory,
When God’s eternal ways you set in sight,
And Virtue shines in all her native light,
In vain would Vice her works in night conceal,
For Wisdom’s eye pervades the sable veil.11

Here, Wheatley presented a central theme of her poetry: a comparison of
light and darkness that anticipated the Emersonian and Holmesian appeals
to the Hegelian “Abgrund” or “Ungrund” void or abyss whence Nietzsche
later drew his Will to Power.12 Wheatley knew that darkness was the biblical
AQUINAS, supra note 7, at 389, 470–72. However, with Hobbes scholars may distinguish pride from
magnanimity because Hobbes did so in his definitions. Compare HOBBES, supra note 2, at 32, with id.,
at 46 (differentiating the now accepted usage in the English language). Cf. RUSSELL, A HISTORY, supra
note 1, at 550 (noting that in Hobbes’s “state of nature, there is no property, no justice or injustice;
there is only war, and ‘force and fraud are, in war, the two cardinal virtues’”).
9. HOBBES, supra note 2, at 46–48, 108 (declaring men inherently pervaded by pride and
dejection, which in turn lifts Leviathan into power, and explaining how “he that should be modest, and
tractable, and performe all he promises, in such time, and place, where no man else should do so,
should but make himselfe a prey to others, and procure his own certain ruine”). But see Cicero,
De Officiis 1.15.47 (“no duty is more imperative than that of proving one’s gratitude”).
10. See Phillis Wheatley, An Hymn to Humanity [1773] (“For when thy pitying eye did see / The
languid muse in low degree, / Then, then at thy desire / Descended the celestial nine; / O’er me
methought they deign’d to shine / And deign’d to string my lyre.”). See, e.g., HENRI GRÉGOIRE,
AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING THE INTELLECTUAL AND MORAL FACULTIES, AND LITERATURE OF
NEGROS 103 (Graham Russell Hodges ed., 1997) (presaging the romantic era in literature that
Wheatley inspired, the supportive, French clergyman Grégoire read of her works and noted:
“The sentimental Phillis . . . died of a broken heart.”).
11. Phillis Wheatley, To the Rev. Dr. Thomas Amory on Reading His Sermons on Daily Devotion, in which
that
Duty
is
Recommended
and
Assisted
[1773];
cf.
Cicero,
De Officiis 1.15.47 (noting that gratitude is the greatest duty).
12. Compare Phillis Wheatley, To the Rev. Dr. Thomas Amory on Reading His Sermons on Daily
Devotion, in which that Duty is Recommended and Assisted [1773], with RALPH WALDO EMERSON, ESSAYS,
FIRST SERIES 247 (1850) (“[A]s there is no screen or ceiling between our heads and the infinite heavens,
so is there no bar or wall in the soul where man, the effect, ceases, and God, the cause, begins.”),
Beniamino Soressi, Europe in Emerson and Emerson in Europe, in MR. EMERSON’S REVOLUTION 325, 326,
365–67 (Jean McClure Mudge ed., 2015) (“Unfortunately in Germany, Nietzsche misused central
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womb of creation, as well as the tomb to which we are destined to return.13
Wheatley showed us how the human imagination mimics a place of creation
and rest, dark and warm, appearing as if dead but not dead, so that human
beings can invent new works of art, unchained from the dogmas of inherent
madness established by Hobbesian ideology.14
Professor Karla V. Zelaya’s research into Wheatley’s counter-slavery
strategies found that through mimicry, Phillis Wheatley spoke “doublevoiced and double-languaged.”15 Zelaya noted how Wheatley “spoke out
of both sides of her mouth,”16 and by doing so she was “able to speak back”
to white power in the revolutionary era.17 Zelaya was the first to locate the
origin of Wheatley’s resistance in “irreverent double-talk,” in large part
inspiring this series.18
As Zelaya described, Phillis Wheatley smiled upon her enemies with skin
teeth, but her forgiveness was designed as a witness to the evils of slavery.19
The very burden of being forced to speak in double-entendres, because of
rampant cognitive dissonance in the white population, is a sign of surviving

Emersonian ideas, which Hitler and the Nazis then further perverted. In Italy, the poet-politician
D’Annunzio and Mussolini were closer to Emerson’s texts per se, yet similarly corrupted his original
intent.”), and Adam H. Hines, Ralph Waldo Emerson and Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.: The Subtle Rapture of
Postponed Power, 44 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 39, 42, 46–47 (2019) (quoting Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path
of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 478 (1897) [hereinafter Holmes, Jr., The Path]) (“Holmes’ decision
in Buck v. Bell (1927) embodied an Emersonian premium on self-reliance. . . . Emerson labeled the
inspiration as the ‘Divine Soul,’ whereas Holmes named his calling ‘an echo of the infinite’ and ‘the
universal law,’ thereby emulating the passion and the prose of Emerson.”).
13. Genesis 1:2; cf. Valarie Kaur, Speech at the National Moral Revival Watch Night Service, YOUTUBE
(Feb. 8, 2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qQ7QlKG70LE, printed in VALARIE KAUR,
SEE NO STRANGER: A MEMOIR AND MANIFESTO OF REVOLUTIONARY LOVE vii–xv (2021).
14. See Matilda, On Reading the Poems of Phillis Wheatley, the African Poetess [1796] (confirming the
inspiration Wheatley gave to the Americans); Phillis Wheatley, On Imagination [1773].
15. Karla V. Zelaya, Sweat the Technique: Visible-izing Praxis Through Mimicry in Phillis Wheatley’s
“On Being Brought from Africa to America” 4 (Sep. 2015) (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Massachusetts
Amherst) (on file with ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst).
16. Id. at 67.
17. Id. at 84.
18. Id. at 92.
19. See id. at 11–12 (“Whether in a dining room or on the page, Wheatley may have bowed to
tradition but ‘only the better / to rise and strike / again’” (quoting Grace Nichols, Skin Teeth [1983]));
see also Phillis Wheatley, To the Right Honorable William, Earl of Dartmouth [1773] (“Should you, my lord,
while you peruse my song, / Wonder from whence my love of Freedom sprung, / Whence flow these
wishes for the common good, / By feeling hearts alone best understood, / I, young in life, by seeming
cruel fate / Was snatch’d from Afric’s fancy’d happy seat: / . . . Steel’d was that soul and by no misery
mov’d / That from a father seiz’d his babe belov’d: / Such, such my case. And can I then but pray /
Others may never feel tyrannic sway?”).
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abuse.20 Wheatley demonstrated how the humble may yet dispute
Hobbesian plays of freedom against slavery that keep both through
Hegelian “dialectical sublation” (Aufhebung).21
Hobbes convinced the Puritans to abandon imperfect republican virtues
for the perfect vices of the Lord Protector Oliver Cromwell.22 Phillis
Wheatley thoughtfully countered the Cromwellian madness Hobbes stoked
by using double-speak in her funeral elegies to minister to her enemies as
well as her friends.23 Americans may yet follow her example, to minister to
those still stuck in a paradoxical state of madness as exemplified by Hobbes,
Hegel, and Holmes.24

20. Zelaya, supra note 15, at 4; see Letter from Phillis Wheatley to Samson Occom (Mar. 11,
1774) (speaking of slaveholders: “This I desire not for their Hurt, but to convince them of the strange
Absurdity of their Conduct whose Words and Actions are so diametrically, opposite. How well the
Cry for Liberty, and the reverse Disposition for the exercise of oppressive Power over others agree,—
I humbly think it does not require the Penetration of a Philosopher to determine[.]”); cf. RUSSELL,
A HISTORY, supra note 1, at 730–35.
21. Compare Zelaya, supra note 15, at 4, with Guyora Binder, Master, Slavery, and Emancipation,
10 CARDOZO L. REV. 1435, 1477 (1989) (explaining Hegel’s dialectic treatment of slavery versus
freedom: the idea of “‘Aufhebung’—a negation that also preserves”); cf. RUSSELL, A HISTORY, supra note
1, at 733–34.
22. HOBBES, supra note 2, at 46–48; id. at 268 (perhaps imagining Cromwell when he hoped
“that one time or other, this writing of mine, may fall into the hands of a Soveraign, who will consider
it himselfe, (for it is short, and I think clear,) without the help of any interessed, or envious Interpreter;
and by the exercise of entire Soveraignty, in protecting the Publique teaching of it, convert this Truth
of Speculation, into the Utility of Practice”); see James J. Hamilton, Hobbes the Royalist, Hobbes the
Republican, 30 HIST. POL. THOUGHT 411, 450 (2009).
23. Letter from Phillis Wheatley to Samson Occom (Feb. 11, 1774) (responding directly to
Hobbesian double-speak in America: “How well the Cry for Liberty, and the reverse Disposition for
the exercise of oppressive Power over others agree,—I humbly think it does not require the Penetration
of a Philosopher to determine.”). See Phillis Wheatley, To His Honor the Lieutenant Governor on the Death
of His Lady March 24th, 1773 [1773] (expressing deep seated compassion for her enemies, here the
loyalist Andrew Oliver, by helping them face death and offering them a song of hope: “All conquering
Death! By thy resistless power, / Hope’s tow’ring plumage falls to rise no more!”); cf. Joshua J.
Schroeder, We Will All Be Free or None Will Be: Why Federal Power is Not Plenary, but Limited and Supreme,
27 TEX. HISP. J.L. POL’Y 1, 97–99 (2021) [Schroeder, We Will] (focusing on Wheatley’s longest poem
Niobe in Distress as an example of how an artist can love her enemies as one of her own); Joshua J.
Schroeder, Leviathan Goes to Washington: How to Assert the Separation of Powers in Defense of Future Generations,
15 FLA. A&M U.L. REV. 1, 159–60 n.898 (2021) [hereinafter Schroeder, Leviathan] (“Wheatley focused
directly upon the Puritan funeral elegy and redeemed it in the present moment to support the
revolution with a unique song of hope for the world to come.”); id. at 141 (quoting Phillis Wheatley’s
consideration of the Puritan experiment: “Indeed, ever since the Puritan Revolution sank England into
‘the great depth . . . hell’s profound domain,’ the English Crown came to embody the political realism
espoused by Cromwell.”); Kesha, Shadow [2020].
24. See Harmon-Jones, supra note 3 (discussing the dissonance between Trump supporters and
their morals and beliefs); Zelaya, supra note 15, at 84.
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In pursuit of Wheatley’s ministry, Part III examines pre-existing human
rights in the light of the Free Kesha movement.25 Then it will explain the
American distinction between rights and powers, and especially how this
distinction separated America from British Monarchy.26 Finally, Part III
will demonstrate how John Adams used his memory and imagination, rather
than an innate capacity for reasoning to safeguard the common law in
America.27
A. HOW TO USE THE FREE KESHA MOVEMENT AS A FRAMEWORK FOR
PRE-EXISTING RIGHTS
In his Lochner v. New York dissent, Justice Holmes stated his belief that “a
Constitution is not intended to embody a particular economic theory,
whether of paternalism and the organic relation of the citizen to the state or
of laissez faire.”28 As already noted in Parts I & II of this series, Holmes did
not follow his own advice.29 Rather, Holmes revealed the irony in his
Lochner statement against economic theories when he construed the First
Amendment to embody John Stuart Mill’s utilitarian economic theory of a
“marketplace of ideas.”30
Holmes always seemed to speak out of both sides of his mouth.31 Thus,
to express disagreement with Holmes is tricky, because silence regarding
one of his contradictions could be taken as an implicit endorsement of the

25. See Maura Johnston, Kesha and Dr. Luke: Everything You Need to Know to Understand the Case,
ROLLING STONE (Feb. 22, 2016, 10:34 PM), https://www.rollingstone.com/music/music-news/
kesha-and-dr-luke-everything-you-need-to-know-to-understand-the-case-106731/ [https://perma.cc/
HTV9-FGNQ].
26. Cf. JOHN ADAMS, THE REVOLUTIONARY WRITINGS OF JOHN ADAMS 34 (C. Bradley
Thompson ed., 2000) [hereinafter ADAMS, THE REVOLUTIONARY] (considering “matters of power
and of right”).
27. Id. at 145.
28. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
29. Id.
30. Irene M. Ten Cate, Speech, Truth, and Freedom: An Examination of John Stuart Mill’s and
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’ Free Speech Defenses, 22 YALE J. L. & HUMAN. 35, 38–39 (2010); Vincent
Blasi, Holmes and the Marketplace of Ideas, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 19 (2004); Phillip Thompson, Silent
Protest: A Catholic Justice Dissents in Buck v. Bell, 43 CATHOLIC LAWYER 125, 131–32 (2004) (noting on
a more serious note that Holmes also applied Mill’s utilitarian economics in support of eugenics).
31. Rodney A. Smolla, The Trial of Oliver Wendell Holmes, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 173, 217
(1994) (noting how Holmes actually believed he was being consistent in Debs v. United States and did
not change his mind in Abrams v. United States but applied the same way of thinking as he always had
done).
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opposite.32 As demonstrated here, Kesha’s style of irreverent doubletalk,33 if it may be fairly compared to Wheatley’s original strategies,34
provides a useful framework to contend with the cognitive dissonance in
Justice Holmes.35
Justice Holmes’ dissent in Abrams v. United States had a profound effect
upon the Court’s later First Amendment decisions.36
Due to
Justice Holmes’ induction of a utilitarian economic theory of free speech
into constitutional law,37 the court opened the door to Hobbesian force and
fraud in America.38 QAnon grew up under Holmes’ marketplace of ideas
ideology until it attempted to end American democracy on January 6, 2021,
where QAnon followers equated a violent, Trumpian coup d’état with First
Amendment freedoms of speech and assembly.39
32. Compare Lochner, 198 U.S. at 75 (counseling against the constitutionalization of economic
theories that Holmes disliked), with Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting) (constitutionalizing utilitarian economic theory); cf. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann,
285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (encouraging the states’ “right to experiment” with
“things social and economic” and giving the now popular idea of the states as “laborator[ies]”—this
view seems to both embrace and reject Holmes’ contradictions in Lochner and Abrams, and it, of course,
turned a blind eye toward Buck v. Bell). One of many examples in Holmes’ scholarship is found in
Natural Law where he purported to expound the natural law, but at the same time disparaged preexisting natural rights; this made mustering a response to Holmes difficult, because you would be in
trouble either way; if you doubted the existence of natural law or if you tried to vindicate the natural
law’s pre-existing rights, Holmes presumably both agreed and disagreed with you at the same time.
Holmes, Natural Law, supra note 1, at 41–42.
33. Kesha, Praying [2017]; see also Kesha, Hymn [2017]; Kesha, Shadow [2020].
34. Cf. Zelaya, supra note 15.
35. See, e.g., Smolla, supra note 31, at 217 (highlighting the difficulties in expressing disagreement
with Holmes).
36. See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 458 (2011) (citing Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397,
414 (1989)); Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358 (2003) (citing Abrams, 250 U.S. at 628 (Homles, J.,
dissenting)); Johnson, 491 U.S. at 418–19 (citing Abrams, 250 U.S. at 628 (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
37. Ten Cate, supra note 30, at 61–62; Blasi, supra note 30, at 19; cf. Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Freedom
of Speech in War Time, 32 HARV. L. REV. 932, 955 (1919) (lauding Justice Holmes’ transplantation of the
philosophy of John Stuart Mill into First Amendment jurisprudence).
38. See Snyder, 562 U.S. at 458 (quoting Johnson, 491 U.S. at 414); Black, 538 U.S. at 358 (citing
Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting)); cf. Ten Cate, supra note 30, at 66–67 (“The notion of
societal progress, which underlies Mill’s free speech defense, seems utterly foreign to Holmes.”);
Holmes, Law in Science, supra note 1 at 449 (explaining progress as a much more brutal undertaking than
Mill idealized, i.e., a “struggle for life among competing ideas, and of the ultimate victory and survival
of the strongest”).
39. Justin Hyland, Conspiracy Speech: Reimagining the First Amendment in the Age of QAnon, 44
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 1, 11 (2021) (“As it currently stands, the jurisprudence is skewed heavily
toward speech-protection. This preference mirrors the presiding liberal First Amendment regime . . . .
Inherent within the prevailing dogma is the concept of the ‘marketplace of ideas’ . . . [which]
fundamentally resists government censorship, even censorship of dangerous or hateful expression.
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Perhaps free speech inherently harbors dangerous ideologies.40 Perhaps
the First Amendment was predestined to be conflated with Mill’s utilitarian
economic theories.41 Even if this were so, Holmes’ embrace of the
marketplace of ideas did not save Eugene Debs,42 nor did it help members
of Anonymous reveal the lies of Scientology,43 nor did it help Heather
Heyer overcome American Nazis in Charlottesville,44 nor did it safeguard
those who sang out This Little Light of Mine in the wake of Heyer’s death
from threats of Hobbesian force and fraud.45
Instead, speech regulation is left to the democratic masses.”); id. at 18–19, 22, 40 (referring to January
6, 2021 as part of the “violent action” that is “linked directly to” the speech of QAnon conspiracy
theorists); James M. McGoldrick, Jr., Symbolic Speech: A Message from Mind to Mind, 61 OKLA. L. REV. 1,
18–19 (2008) (“Violent acts . . . may be intended to convey a message every bit as clearly as the best of
theatre pieces, and the public is every bit as likely to understand the message.”); Alec MacGillis, Inside
the Capitol Riot: What the Parler Videos Reveal, PROPUBLICA (Jan. 17, 2021, 3:00 PM),
https://www.propublica.org/article/inside-the-capitol-riot-what-the-parler-videos-reveal (quoting the
speech of Capitol rioters: “‘This is our house. This is not their house. Our tax money pays for their
salaries, our tax money pays for everything. It pays for their freaking $40,000 furniture allotment for
their offices while we have families starving in the street.’ Our house. It is the most dominant phrase of
any of the chants shouted by the mob as it presses into the Capitol. It is an expression of entitlement—
white nativist entitlement, as many have noted: This is our house, our country.”). To the minds of many
QAnon supporters of the January 6 insurrection, the Capitol rioters were representatives of the people
as a whole and simply destroyed their own house in protest of Trump’s impending political loss under
prevailing First Amendment jurisprudence that protects “symbolic speech.” Texas v. Johnson, 491
U.S. 397, 406 (1989) (quoting Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409 (1974)) (“Johnson’s burning
of the flag was conduct ‘sufficiently imbued with elements of communication,’ . . . to implicate the
First Amendment.”). Compare Ten Cate, supra note 30, at 67 (quoting Holmes, Natural Law, supra note 1,
at 40) (noting that Holmes “defines truth as ‘the majority vote of that nation that could lick all others’”),
with Q: Into the Storm, The Storm (HBO 2021).
40. Nat’l Socialist Party of Am. v. Vill. of Skokie, 432 U.S. 43, 43–44 (1977); cf. STEVEN D.
SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE 13–15 (1995).
41. Blasi, supra note 30, at 19.
42. Smolla, supra note 31, at 217.
43. Brian Knappenberger, We Are Legion: The Story of the Hacktivists, YOUTUBE (Nov. 25, 2005),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-zwDhoXpk90 [https://perma.cc/J2SV-6V76] (telling the story
of how Anonymous took on Scientology, and how Scientology beat the hacktivists by using the United
States courts).
44. Joe Heim, Recounting a Day of Rage, Hate, Violence and Death, WASH. POST (Aug. 14, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2017/local/charlottesville-timeline/ [https://perma.cc/
8YUC-DYWC].
45. Id. (“At 9:30 a.m., about 30 clergy members clasped arms and began singing ‘This Little
Light of Mine.’ Twenty feet away, the white nationalists roared back, ‘Our blood, our soil!’”); Katherine
Cusumano, In Charlottesville, a Low-Key Vigil for Heather Heyer Turned Into a Ceremony of Thousands Singing
By Candlelight, W MAG. (Aug. 17, 2017), https://www.wmagazine.com/story/charlottesville-heatherheyer-vigil (“Heyer’s mother, Susan Bro, took the podium during the ceremony: ‘They tried to kill my
child to shut her up. Well, guess what? You just magnified her,’ she said . . . .”); Cheryl C. Boots, “This
Little Light of Mine” vs. “Jews Will Not Replace Us”, CTR. INTERDISCIPLINARY TEACHING & LEARNING:
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Holmes’ sympathizers usually argue that he “changed his mind” about
the First Amendment.46 However, a wider look at his contradictory
opinions seems to suggest he was actually subsumed by Hobbesian doubleconsciousness or cognitive dissonance, such that he unwittingly held several
contradictory views at the same time.47 Prior to Kahneman & Tversy’s
Nobel Prize-winning research that scientifically demonstrated the flaws of
rationalistic thought,48 Professor Rodney A. Smolla attempted to expose
Holmes’ contradictions.49
IMPACT (2018), https://sites.bu.edu/impact/previous-issues/impact-summer-2018/this-little-lightof-mine-vs-jews-will-not-replace-us/ (“Chanting may not have caused Heather Heyer’s death, but it
contributed to an environment of verbal and physical aggression that led to her murder.”); cf. Virginia
v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358 (2003); Sandra Day O’Connor, They Often Are Half Obscure: The Rights of the
Individual and the Legacy of Oliver W. Holmes, 29 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 385, 389 (1992) [hereinafter
O’Connor, They Often] (presenting Holmes’ disparagement of human rights, when he said that rights
were “no more than a romantic ideal with no place in the rough and tumble world”—Holmes’ free
speech and human rights ideologies clearly resonated with those of the Charlottesville protesters).
46. See THOMAS HEALY, THE GREAT DISSENT: HOW OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES CHANGED
HIS MIND—AND CHANGED THE HISTORY OF FREE SPEECH IN AMERICA 243 (2013); David S.
Bogen, The Free Speech Metamorphosis of Mr. Justice Holmes, 11 HOFSTRA L. REV. 97, 141 (1982). But see
Smolla, supra note 31, at 217 (noting Holmes likely did not change his mind); Chafee, Jr., supra note 37,
at 944, 967–69 (demonstrating that despite this article is usually given credit for convincing
Justice Holmes to author his dissent in Abrams, it did not appear to contend that Schenck or Debs was
wrongly decided).
47. Compare Holmes, Law in Science, supra note 1, at 457 (exemplifying his strategy of pulling
bright line rules from between the contradictions in law or society), with HOBBES, supra note 2,
at 46–48 (explaining how a totalitarian government can be derived from the contradictory emotional
state of pride and dejection), and RUSSELL, A HISTORY, supra note 1, at 730–35 (explaining the Hegelian
version of Hobbesian ideology popular in the WWII era).
48. DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 377–78, 381 (2011) (noting that the
“tyranny of the remembering self” stops human beings from accurately measuring their past
experiences of pain or pleasure, such that they are not inherently capable of knowing what actions can
be taken in the present to maximize their pain or pleasure in the future, i.e., Benthamite prophesies of
future pain or pleasure are unreliable and utilitarianism is unreliable); see Abrams v. United States,
250 U.S. 616, 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (constitutionalizing utilitarian economic theory); Holmes, Jr.,
The Path, supra note 12, at 457–58 (setting forth a theory “of dogma or systematized prediction which
we call the law,” and hoping that by studying the law as he defined it men would be enabled “to
prophesy in their turn,” i.e., Holmes’ idea of the law itself turned upon the idea that human beings are
inherently capable of determining right action from past experience, something that can no longer be
presumed possible under Kahneman’s research—Holmes’ statements such as “[t]he primary rights and
duties with which jurisprudence busies itself again are nothing but prophecies,” means that Holmes
only believed in laws and rights that manifested in actual practice, not merely those that have been
legislated or constitutionally ratified on paper, such that Holmes is at once both the absolute idealist
and the absolute skeptic); id. at 475 (“to be a master of [the law] means to look straight through all the
dramatic incidents and to discern the true basis for prophecy”).
49. Smolla, supra note 31, at 217; cf. RUSSELL, A HISTORY, supra note 1, at 673 (noting a “growth
of unreason throughout the nineteenth century and what has passed of the twentieth”).
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Holmes’ contradictory ideas regarding free speech and the marketplace
of ideas took center stage in copyright law.50 On one hand, like Mill’s
marketplace of ideas, Justice Holmes disagreed with the Court’s expansion
of common law copyright to create a new form of property in International
News Service v. Associated Press.51 On the other hand, Holmes seemed to say
the exact opposite in Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Company.52
If one reads only International News Service, one may think Holmes opposed
overly expansive property rights out of prudential restraint.53 However,
when reading International News Service in the light of Bleistein, it appears that
Holmes only rejected copyright-as-property because if he acknowledged a
judge-made property right the scope of the property right could be
restrained by judges and juries rather than legislatures and statutes.54
Holmes preferred property rights granted by Congress to those maintained
by judges,55 which can sound like judicial restraint and perhaps in a sense it
is, but it also appeared to bring about Hohfeldian judicial activism,56

50. Compare Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 246 (1918) (Opinion per
Holmes, J.), with Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 252 (1903).
51. Int’l News Serv., 248 U.S. at 246 (Opinion per Holmes, J.).
52. Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 252. Congress relied on Holmes’ opinion in Bleistein to extend copyright
to potentially any original work capable of being authored and fixed in a tangible medium. See Lydia
Pallas Loren, Law, Money, and Visual Art, 22 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1331, 1348 (2019).
53. Int’l News Serv., 248 U.S. at 246 (Opinion per Holmes, J.).
54. Compare id., with Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 252. The real travesty of Holmes’ opinion in
International News Service is that he wanted to enjoin the International News Service in order to force it
to acknowledge the real source of the news it reported, which was the Associated Press. Int’l News
Serv., 248 U.S. at 246 (Opinion per Holmes, J.). Yet, by extension of his original thought, he denied
any property could exist in the Associated Press’s labor to produce the news, which would have been
a much sounder basis for his opinion that an injunction should issue; the right he wanted to protect,
while failing to allow its existence in words, appeared to be the original moral right of attribution, which
was affirmed in Folsom v. Marsh and vindicated in the American Revolution by Phillis Wheatley. See
Schroeder, We Will, supra note 23, at 52 n.450.
55. Compare Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 252 (presenting the legal positivist idea that anything that carries
value can be property), with HOBBES, supra note 2, at 21 (“For one man calleth Wisdome, what another
calleth feare; and one cruelty, what another justice; one prodigality, what another magnanimity; and
one gravity, what another stupidicy, &c. And therefore such names can never be true grounds of any
ratiocination.”).
56. See Wesley N. Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 26 YALE
L.J. 710, 711 n.4, 759–63 (1917) (using Justice Holmes’ nihilistic, Hobbesian relativism as a foundation
for a monetary-value-based view of property, premised on relationships rather than things, which in
turn, proliferated potentially all conceivable property rights known as the bundle of sticks analogy); cf.
Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The New Property of the Nineteenth Century: The Development of the Modern Concept of
Property, 29 BUFF. L. REV. 325, 330, 335, 360 (1980) (using Hohfeld as a rubric, American jurists
transformed the concept of property until it “was no longer solely rights over things, but rights to any
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namely, the dephysicalization of property and the invention of the bundle
of sticks way of thinking about property rights, neither of which can be
categorized as judicial prudence.57
Holmes’ contradiction can be observed in a side-by-side comparison of
quotations in both cases.58 In International News Service Holmes wrote,
“Property, a creation of law, does not arise from value, although
exchangeable—a matter of fact.”59 In Bleistein, Holmes wrote for the Court
that if creative works “command the interest of any public, they have a
commercial value,” and therefore “have rights entitled to the protection of
the law.”60
First, Holmes stated, “It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons
trained only to the law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of
pictorial illustrations.”61 Then, Holmes argued that the Court cannot grant
property rights to something just because it has value.62 In International News
Service Holmes participated in the very “dangerous undertaking” that he
warned against in Bleistein,63 all the while defending an injunction to secure
the foundation of common law copyright, which is a form of common law
property, in the attribution rights of authors.64
valuable interest”); Joshua J. Schroeder, Bringing America Back to the Future: Reclaiming a Principle of Honesty
in Property and IP Law, 35 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 1, 4 (2014) [hereinafter Schroeder, Bringing].
57. Vandevelde, supra note 56, at 360; cf. Loren supra note 52, at 1342 (explaining in practical
terms how establishing monetary value for art tends to have the effect of legitimizing the artwork).
Professor Loren’s observation about the role of monetary value in establishing the theoretical existence
of an artist’s property rights under statute took an extremely uncomfortable role in case of Vivien
Meyer, a photographer who never sought to monetize her photographs, and whose legacy is only
known to the public because a random person found her film roles and began to internalize the value
of her photographs, treating them as if he were their author in order to avail himself of Visual Artist
Rights Act (VARA) rights by signing the backs of the photos. VARA, 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a); 17 U.S.C.
§ 101 (defining a protectable “work of visual art” as “a still photographic image produced for exhibition
purposes only . . . in a limited edition of 200 copies or fewer that are signed and consecutively
numbered by the author” as a “work of visual art,” which may claim protections under VARA);
Documentary Film: Finding Vivian Maier, http://www.vivianmaier.com/film-finding-vivian-maier/
[https://perma.cc/398D-V2E3] (last visited on Apr. 24, 2022) (a webpage owned by the “Maloof
Collection, Ltd.”).
58. Compare Int’l News Serv., 248 U.S. at 246 (Opinion per Holmes, J.), with Bleistein, 188 U.S.
at 251–52.
59. Int’l News Serv., 248 U.S. at 246 (Opinion per Holmes, J.).
60. Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 252.
61. Id. at 251.
62. Int’l News Serv., 248 U.S. at 246 (Opinion per Holmes, J.).
63. Compare id., with Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 251–52.
64. Int’l News Serv., 248 U.S. at 248 (Opinion per Holmes, J.) (“I think that . . . the defendant
should be enjoined from publishing news obtained from the Associated Press for hours after
publication by the plaintiff unless it gives express credit to the Associated Press, the number of hours
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Both Holmes in International News Service and Holmes in Bleistein arguably
applied the marketplace of ideas framework.65 The marketplace of ideas
prefers that judges abstain from enforcing the First Amendment objects of
the encouragement of peace and the discovery of truth,66 for fear that it
would have a chilling effect.67 Paradoxically, naming forums for speech a
“marketplace” presumes a measure of enforceable good faith and fair
dealing to avoid force or fraud, which are the actual elements in relation to
speech that should be feared for their chilling effects.68
A similar irony pervaded the Lochner idea of laissez faire freedom of
contract.69 This theory was the conceptual descendent of the English
antebellum case Le Louis, which advocated the absolute irony of a free trade
in human flesh.70 The freedom of contract ideology was later translated
into the postbellum era in America by The Slaughterhouse Cases,71 as presented

and the form of acknowledgment to be settled by the district court.”). Justice Holmes missed a golden
opportunity to vindicate the copyright ideals upheld in Folsom v. Marsh that were ultimately founded
upon the copyright of Phillis Wheatley in 1772. Id.; Schroeder, Leviathan, supra note 23, at 210.
65. Compare Int’l News Serv., 248 U.S. at 246 (Opinion per Holmes, J.), with Bleistein, 188 U.S.
at 251–52; cf. Smolla, supra note 31, at 217 (maintaining the likelihood that despite his contradiction
that Holmes did not intend to change his mind).
66. ROGER WILLIAMS, THE BLOODY TENENT 1, 11–13 (1644) [hereinafter WILLIAMS I]
(naming the two purposes of free speech throughout: truth and peace); cf. Isaac Backus, An Appeal to
the Public for Religious Liberty 25–26 [1773] (quoting ROGER WILLIAMS, THE BLOODY TENENT MADE
YET MORE BLOODY 192 (1652) [hereinafter WILLIAMS II]).
67. Nat’l Socialist Party of Am. v. Vill. of Skokie, 432 U.S. 43, 44 (1977) (per curiam); cf. Wieman
v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 195 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Compare Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630
(Holmes, J., dissenting), with Int’l News Serv., 248 U.S. at 246 (Opinion per Holmes, J.), and Bleistein,
188 U.S. at 251–52.
68. Compare Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting), with OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES,
JR., THE COMMON LAW 319, 323–25, 332, 381 (1881) (giving examples of how contracts and property
acquisitions with a basis of force or fraud are voidable, and that it is incumbent upon the courts to
enforce such limitations on contracts so as to make marketplaces free from force or fraud).
69. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
70. Le Louis [1817] 2 Dodson 210, 264 (Eng.).
71. Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589–90 (1897), citing Butcher’s Union Co. v. Crescent
City Co., 111 U.S. 746, 762 (1884) (Bradley, J., concurring), decided according to Slaughterhouse Cases,
83 U.S. 36, 71–76 (1873) (preserving and extending Dred Scott’s interpretation of the United States social
compact to ensure workers’ rights continued to be unprotected despite African slavery being
abolished). Some scholars point to Justice Field’s Slaughterhouse dissent as the origin of the freedom of
contract ideology, but this would be to take the laissez faire doctrine seriously when in fact its purpose
was to justify derogations of workers’ rights like the majority of Slaughterhouse did, without an actual,
logical basis. Slaughterhouse, 83 U.S. at 106 (Field, J., dissenting); cf. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,
399 (1923) (citing to the majority opinion in Slaughterhouse as lead support for “the right of the individual
to contract”).
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in The Dark Side of Due Process: Part I,72 and was most recently reinvigorated
in Integrity Staffing Solutions, Inc. v. Busk.73
In Busk, the Court decided that the presupposition of all work being paid
work is only triggered if one enters into a written contract with their
employer.74 Without written contract terms explicitly stating that all work
is to be paid work, some work may be unpaid, i.e., under Busk what is
basically slave labor can now be implicitly required without a written contract
as a condition of being hired for other paid work.75 Busk may be interpreted
by future courts to mean that all implied contracts for work are contracts
for indentured servitude unless a written provision in a contract state
otherwise.76
72. This topic is discussed at note 265 of The Dark Side of Due Process: Part I and accompanying
text, which cites to these sources: Slaughterhouse, 83 U.S. at 77–82, 105 (disregarding the Civil Rights
Act of 1870 in the context of state laws that allegedly recreated a system of involuntary servitude
through monopolies), extended in Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589–90 (1897) (developing the
idea of “liberty of contract” from Slaughterhouse’s disregard for the right of United States citizens not to
be enslaved). See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905) (following Allgeyer, and by transitive
horcrux through Slaughterhouse, Dred Scott, by completely disregarding the fundamental right of workers
to make a living wage in a safe work environment, which was the original right of life exclaimed by the
Case of Monopolies that Slaughterhouse scandalously rejected). Cf. Schroeder, Leviathan, supra note 23,
at 274–76 (explaining the original conception of “the rights of ordinary working people as a right of
life”).
73. Integrity Staffing Solutions, Inc. v. Busk, 574 U.S. 27, 36–37 (2014) (dismissing the workers’
claim for unpaid work under federal law for lack of a written contract naming their specific activities
as payable: “These arguments are properly presented to the employer at the bargaining table, see
29 U.S.C. § 254(b)(1), not to a court in an FLSA [Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended by the
Portal to Portal Act of 1947] claim.”).
74. Id.
75. Id. The question of the enforcement of contracts for personal services, like the employment
contracts litigated in Busk, was traditionally linked to a legal discussion about how employment law
must preclude the condition of slavery and Judge Kornreich specifically noted that the court was
treading this near this line in Kesha’s lawsuit as well. Gottwald v. Sebert, 2016 N.Y. Mic. LEXIS 5202,
at *32 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2016) (citing Am. Broadcasting Cos. V. Wolf, 52 N.Y.2d 394, 401–02 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1981)) (“Courts generally will not enforce a contract for personal services because slavery has
been outlawed since the 19th century.”); see Lea S. VanderVelde, The Gendered Origins of the Lumley
Doctrine: Binding Men’s Consciences and Women’s Fidelity, 101 YALE L.J. 775, 779, 794–95 (1992) (explaining
the role of slavery as a foil in the ebb and flow of American employment law that is too often forgotten
especially in the discussion of entertainment contracts involving women: “When Lumley first appeared
in the United States, the cultural repulsion to anything that even hinted of slavery led to its unequivocal
rejection. But later in the century, the cultural aversion to mastery had lessened and no longer seemed
to apply to men’s domination of women in particular.”). Busk’s apparent lack of concern about whether
slavery could occur due to its interpretation of the employment law bucks the employment law tradition
observed by Professor VanderVelde of using slavery as a foil to ensure justice in the context of not
only the employment of women, but of the entire working class. Id.; Busk, 574 U.S. at 36–37.
76. See Busk, 574 U.S. at 36–37 (deciding workers have the right and power to make their work
compensable by negotiating for it and securing it in a written contract, and giving this freedom of
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Justice Holmes believed that workers had no relevant preexisting rights
to health or safety on the job,77 and he did not believe in Lockean property
creation,78 or even the right to an education.79 Nevertheless, he did believe
that Congress and state legislatures could expand workers’ legal rights,80
secure rights to compensation for labor,81 and the citizen’s right to
privacy.82 These contradictions in the law, as exemplified by Holmes,
explains how Kesha’s preexisting property rights were essentially maximized
by Congress,83 while her most essential employment rights were denied
existence by the court in Gottwald v. Sebert (Kesha v. Dr. Luke).84 Congress
can maximize Kesha’s earning power for Sony,85 but cannot protect her
from violence that is inflicted at work directly under Sony’s watch.86
contract rationale as the reason why federal law does not make Amazon’s requirement that warehouse
workers go through unpaid security checks compensable under federal law), applied by Balestrieri v.
Menlo Park Fire Prot. Dist., 800 F.3d 1094, 1100–01 (9th Cir. 2015), and Dinkel v. Medstar Health
Inc., 99 F. Supp. 3d 37, 40 (D.C. Cir. 2015); cf. Lumley v. Wagner [1852] 42 Eng. Rep. 687 (Eng.);
VanderVelde, supra note 75, at 795, 806 (citing Ford v. Jermon, 6 Phila. 6 (Dist. Ct. 1865); Daly v.
Smith, 49 How. Pr. (n.s.) 150 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1874)) (explaining the employment contracts disputed
in American courts adjudicated after Lumley was decided around the time the Thirteenth Amendment
was ratified, and noting cases that expanded (i.e., Ford v. Jermon) and narrowed (i.e., Daly v. Smith)
workers’ rights involving Lumley, especially their right to quit their jobs).
77. See Quong Wing v. Kirkendall, 223 U.S. 59, 63–64 (1912) (commenting upon the
differentness of Chinese people, Justice Holmes infamously wrote that “the Fourteenth Amendment
does not interfere by creating a fictitious equality where there is a real difference”—this sentiment
directed at Chinese women, implying their work was inferior, informed his opinions in favor of states
regulating women’s employment generally symbolized by Muller v. Oregon); cf. Holmes, Natural Law,
supra note 1, at 41–42 (describing his general opposition to the idea of pre-existing rights).
78. Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 246 (1918) (Opinion per Holmes, J.).
79. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 403, 412–13 (1923) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (noting the
Meyer dissent was appended after the next case Bartels v. Iowa, which was decided according to Meyer, in
order to allow languages other than English to be taught in public schools).
80. See, e.g., Adkins v. Children’s Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 567–68 (1923) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
81. See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 252 (1903) (explaining not
calling the copyrights secured by Congress “property” but securing these rights all the same); Adkins,
261 U.S. at 567–68 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
82. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 469–71 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
83. Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 252; Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221–22 (2003) (affirming the
constitutionality of the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998).
84. Gottwald v. Sebert, 193 A.D.3d 573, 582 (N.Y. App. Div. 2021).
85. Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 252; Eldred, 537 U.S. at 221–22 (expanding copyright protections to
what many consider an extreme, despite the “limited times” requirement of U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8,
cl. 8); see Loren supra note 52, at 1342 (noting that “money changes things”).
86. Gottwald, 193 A.D.3d at 582; see Integrity Staffing Solutions, Inc. v. Busk, 574 U.S. 27, 36–
37 (2014); cf. VanderVelde, supra note 75, at 806 (discussing how struggles with employment law, like
Kesha’s struggle to reclaim her right to quit working for Dr. Luke, seem to come straight out of Daly
v. Smith, without consideration of Ford v. Jermon).

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

15

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 53 [2022], No. 4, Art. 2
SCHROEDER III_STEP 5 (DO NOT DELETE)

944

ST. MARY’S LAW JOURNAL

12/10/2022 11:33 AM

[Vol. 53:929

After allegedly surviving abuse and rape at the hands of Lukasz Sebastian
Gottwald, known as “Dr. Luke,” Kesha requested that a California court
release her from her contract with him.87 Dr. Luke sued Kesha for
defamation and breach of contract in New York State.88 Kesha dropped
her suit in California to focus on the lawsuit in New York countersuing
Dr. Luke in New York state court.89
All of Kesha’s countersuits were dismissed by Judge Shirley Werner
Kornreich,90 who failed to properly recuse herself.91 In a decision The
Atlantic labeled “mind-bending,”92 Kornreich dismissed Kesha’s tort suits
refusing to consider “Gottwald’s California conduct” with the unfortunate
choice of words: “Every rape is not a gender-motivated hate crime.”93 In
another decision, Kornreich decided that Kesha’s rape under contract was

87. Dee Lockett et al., The Complete History of Kesha’s Legal Fight Against Dr. Luke, VULTURE
(Apr. 23, 2021), https://www.vulture.com/article/timeline-keshas-legal-fight-against-dr-luke.html
[https://perma.cc/KUE5-UX4U].
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Gottwald v. Sebert, 2016 WL 1365969, at *10 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2016).
91. See Chris Spargo & Patrick Lion, Sleeping With the Enemy? Judge Who Tossed Out Kesha’s Case
Against Sony Married to Partner at Law Firm that Represents the Music Company, DAILYMAIL (Aug. 25, 2016,
11:26 AM), https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3758317/The-judge-threw-Kesha-s-caseagainst-Sony-married-lawyer-firm-works-record-label.html
[https://perma.cc/78A4-TA9R]
(indicating Judge Kornreich had a conflict of interest in Kesha’s case); see also VanderVelde, supra note
75, at 804 (noting that New York case law on the topic of controlling female singers arose from Hayes
v. Willio where Judge Daly failed to recuse himself, because his business interests as well as his brother’s
benefited from the ruling); James V. Grimaldi et al., 131 Federal Judges Broke the Law by Hearing Cases
Where They Had a Financial Interest, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 28, 2021, 9:07 AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/131-federal-judges-broke-the-law-by-hearing-cases-where-they-had-afinancial-interest-11632834421 [https://perma.cc/CJD2-ED7Y] (counting at least 685 federal court
cases where judges failed to recuse themselves since 2010, violating the law).
92. Spencer Kornhaber, Kesha’s Legal Paradox, THE ATLANTIC (Apr. 7, 2016),
https://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2016/04/kesha-dismissal-statute-of-limitations
-dr-luke/477261/ [https://perma.cc/X392-W728] [hereinafter Kornhaber, Kesha’s Legal]:
Perhaps the most mind-bending aspect of Wednesday’s decision involves location. Kesha initially
filed her claims against Gottwald in a California court and said all along that the abuse happened
in California. But Gottwald’s side successfully requested that the case be moved to New York,
citing a provision in Kesha’s record contract about selecting the venue where legal disputes related
to that contract are heard. Once there, though, Luke’s side argued for dismissal of Kesha’s claims
on the ground that they happened in California and therefore did not violate New York law.
Kornreich agreed with this argument, which would seem to raise the question of how Kesha’s
allegations could ever get full consideration in civil court if the defense can move the case away
from where the abuse actually happened.
93. Gottwald, 2016 WL 1365969, at *1, *9.
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“foreseeable,”94 and paradoxically dismissed her reasons to be released
from her contracts as too “speculative.”95
Then, despite Kornreich’s refusal to consider the alleged crimes Dr. Luke
committed in California, the Honorable Jennifer G. Schecter decided that
Kesha’s filing of a lawsuit in California could be a legitimate basis of Dr.
Luke’s suit.96 In another decision, Judge Schecter held that Kesha defamed
Dr. Luke per se for privately texting Lady Gaga to warn her about Dr. Luke
and perhaps to get advice from a fellow female artist about the situation.97
This decision was affirmed on appeal, where, in yet another mind-bending
twist, the court decided that Dr. Luke, who is famous in his own right, is a
private figure.98
Kornreich and Schecter turned a blind eye to the research of
Professor Lea S. VanderVelde into the sexist bases of New York
entertainment law.99 They became willing agents of the retrenchment of
New York cases like Daly v. Smith to virtually shackle female artists to their
male overseers.100 It is almost unbearable to witness modern judges

94. Gottwald v. Sebert, 2017 WL 1062924, at *5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2017), aff’d, 161 A.D.3d 679
(N.Y. App. Div. 2018) (“Gottwald’s allegedly abusive behavior was foreseeable.”).
95. Id. (“It is speculative, not justiciable, whether Sony’s contract is ending and whether it will
be able to assist after this month.”).
96. See Kornhaber, Kesha’s Legal, supra note 92 (detailing Kornreich’s ruling). Compare Gottwald,
2016 WL 1365969, at *9, with Gottwald v. Sebert, No. 653118/2014, 2018 WL 4181723, at *4 n.9 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 2018) (creating an exception to Civil Rights Law § 74, which usually precludes court filings
from being a basis for a SLAPP suit, stating “a trier of fact could possibly conclude that the California
complaint was a sham maliciously filed solely to defame plaintiffs as part of Kesha’s alleged campaign
to destroy Gottwald as leverage to renegotiate her contracts”).
97. Gottwald v. Sebert, No. 653118/2014, 2020 WL 587348, at *10 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2020), aff’d,
193 A.D.3d 573 (N.Y. App. Div. 2021).
98. Gottwald v. Sebert, 193 A.D.3d 573, 582–83 (N.Y. App. Div. 2021).
99. See supra notes 90–98 and accompanying text; VanderVelde, supra note 75, at 778.
100. Compare supra notes 90–96 and accompanying text, with Daly v. Smith, 49 How. Pr. (n.s.)
150 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1874). See VanderVelde, supra note 75, at 800–12 (presenting several significant
characteristics of Judges Daly and Freedman’s rulings that are strikingly similar to Judges Kornreich
and Schecter’s, including Kornreich’s failure to recuse herself for financial interest in the outcome, as
well as Kesha’s similarities with actress Fanny Morant Smith who brought suit to get out of her
contract, even posting “$20,000 surety bond against any damages for breach of contract” because she
no longer wanted to associated with the Dalys, whom she believed were purposely tanking her career).
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retrench Daly-esque ideologies,101 when Ford v. Jermon was already
vindicated in the Yale Law Journal.102
Kornreich’s dismissal of Kesha’s countersuits did nothing to support the
court’s grounds to affirm the legitimacy of Sony’s contracts if they were
based in the crimes Kesha alleged.103 The basis of Kesha’s contracts
themselves, i.e., the basis of the bargain, are reviewable as long as the
contracts are in force.104 If there were significant crimes that go to the
heart of Kesha’s contracts with Sony and Dr. Luke, then the contracts are
voidable in Kesha’s favor.105
The cacophony of contradictions uttered by New York state judges to
blind themselves from reviewing contracts with an alleged basis in serious

101. See supra notes 90–96, 98. The nearly unbearable irony of the decisions women judges
made in Gottwald v. Sebert is emphasized by the fact that Kesha’s song Here Comes the Change was featured
in Justice Ginsburg’s biopic On the Basis of Sex, to encourage women to take roles in power including
judgeships. See ON THE BASIS OF SEX (Focus Features 2018) (featuring Kesha, Here Comes the Change
[2018]).
102. VanderVelde, supra note 75, at 799 (citing Ford v. Jermon, 6 Phila. 6 (Dist. Ct. 1865)); cf.
Beverly Glen Music, Inc. v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 178 Cal. App. 3d 1142, 1145 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986)
(releasing famed singer Anita Baker from her former record deal).
103. Compare Gottwald v. Sebert, 2016 WL1365969, at *9 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2016) (dismissing
Kesha’s lawsuit against Dr. Luke), with VanderVelde, supra note 75, at 838 n.335 (considering
Justice Holmes’ reasoning in Rice v. D’Arville in favor of releasing a female singer from her contract),
and Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Bargain Principle and Its Limits, 95 HARV. L. REV. 741, 775 (1982)
[hereinafter Eisenberg, The Bargain] (citing Odorizzi v. Bloomfield Sch. Dist., 246 Cal. App. 2d 123
(1966)) (providing language according to which the courts may consider whether Dr. Luke and Sony
are “more at fault, since [they] deliberately create[d] a kind of transactional incapacity” by both
subjecting Kesha to an atmosphere of physical and psychological abuse and then refusing to renegotiate
or even cancel Dr. Luke’s contractual relationship with Kesha after Kesha affirmatively informed them
of the abuse—this series of events could make Kesha’s entire contract voidable in Kesha’s favor).
104. Gottwald, 2016 WL 1365969, at *10 (dismissing only Kesha’s collateral claims for statute of
limitations). Similarly, under the New York or California statute of limitations, to claim breach of
contract does not apply to questions of voidability due to capacity and other matters that go to the
basis of the bargain itself, i.e., to resolve the question of whether there is a contract at all. Eisenberg,
The Bargain, supra note 103, at 774–75. Furthermore, and similarly, questions that go to an employee’s
right to quit their job also are not bound by breach of contract statutes of limitations. Bailey v.
Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 245 (1911) (overruling a statute that used contract law to justify enslavement
in violation of the U.S. Constitution), examined by VanderVelde, supra note 75, at 838 n.335 (noting that
while Justice Holmes effectively freed a female singer from her contract in Rice v. D’Arville, he
nonetheless wanted to do the opposite in Bailey to African Americans in the South based on exactly
the opposite rationale, where he dissented in favor of upholding an Alabama peonage law).
105. See Eisenberg, The Bargain, supra note 103, at 775–76 (concluding that criminal activity can
give rise to “undue influence”); cf. VanderVelde, supra note 75, at 838 n.335 (indicating that artists like
Kesha also should not be enjoined to perform their contracts either by negative or positive injunctions
even if the contract was legitimate).
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crimes is as astounding as it is grotesque.106 Public concern is justified over
the court’s decision that alleged serious crimes will not be reviewed under
each contracting party’s duties of good faith and fair dealing.107 Outright
public fury is justified by the court’s decision to review retaliatory SLAPP
suits against alleged rape victims trying to contractually extricate themselves
from their rapists.108
In California, Kesha’s private texts warning Lady Gaga about Dr. Luke
would be protected by statute.109 It was not Kesha who made her private
texts public, but her accuser, Dr. Luke.110 Dr. Luke obtained Kesha’s
private texts through discovery and Dr. Luke published them widely,
defaming himself while attempting to convince the public that it was Kesha
rather than him that made the public aware of a rumor going around that
Dr. Luke raped Katy Perry too.111

106. See supra notes 87–102.
107. Gottwald, 2016 WL 1365969, at *9. See, e.g., Lucia Graves, The Kesha ruling is offensive,
dismissive
and
utterly
predictable,
THE GUARDIAN
(Apr. 7, 2016,
10:46
AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/
2016/apr/07/kesha-ruling-shortcomings-legal-system-rape-dr-luke-judge [https://perma.cc/34GF8PM5].
108. Gottwald v. Sebert, No. 653118/2014, 2018 WL 4181723, at *4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2018); cf.
Gottwald v. Sebert, No. 653118/2014, 2020 WL 587348, at *10 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2020), aff’d, 193 A.D.3d
573 (N.Y. App. Div. 2021).
109. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(b)(1) (indicating Kesha’s private texts would be
exempt from evidence at trial). But see La Liberte v. Reid, 966 F.3d 79, 87 (2d Cir. 2020) (limiting
section 425.16 of the California Civil Procedure Code under the plausibility standard in Twombly, a
rationale that may be extended to the New York anti-SLAPP statute).
110. Jem Aswad, Kesha’s Legal Team Claims Major-Label CEO Told Her and Lady Gaga About Dr.
Luke’s Alleged Assault on Katy Perry, VARIETY (June 15, 2018, 12:30 PM), https://variety.com/
2018/music/news/kesha-claims-major-label-ceo-told-her-and-lady-gaga-about-dr-luke-alleged-assault
-on-katy-perry-1202848335/ [https://perma.cc/86RH-UALF] (Kesha’s legal team issued this
statement regarding a rumor spread by “the CEO of a major record label” to Kesha and Lady Gaga:
“The startling statement [about Katy Perry, later discussed by Kesha and Lady Gaga through private
texts] . . . was neither published nor further distributed [by Kesha or Lady Gaga]. It would have
remained completely private, except that Dr. Luke and his team took an email obtained only in
discovery and decided to publish it to millions of people in his amended complaint against Kesha, and
then claim reputational harm from his own widespread publication.”).
111. Id. Katy Perry would probably be within her rights to sue Dr. Luke for doing this as well,
but according to her deposition she felt pressured by “numerous angry Twitter messages,” which seem
to have caused her to perceive both Kesha and Dr. Luke as equally responsible for dragging her name
into the public spotlight of Dr. Luke’s alleged abuse. Maria Pasquini & Jeff Nelson, Katy Perry Says She
‘Felt Pressured’ to Support Kesha Against Dr. Luke in Unsealed Deposition, PEOPLE (Nov. 30, 2018, 4:35 PM),
https://people.com/music/katy-perry-felt-pressured-support-kesha-against-dr-luke-unsealeddeposition/ [https://perma.cc/M63U-HF93].
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Judge Schecter was unfazed by Dr. Luke’s unclean hands publicizing
rumors of his alleged rape of Katy Perry through his suit.112 The New York
court appears uninterested in the central question: were all of Dr. Luke’s
alleged defamation damages actually and proximately caused by his
intervening acts?113 If answered in Kesha’s favor after discovery, several
decisions the court made before discovery might be unsettled as they appear
zealously slanted in favor of big business.114
Several months after Judge Schecter dismissed all of Kesha’s
counterclaims, Kesha’s team seized upon newly enacted updates to the New
York anti-SLAPP statute for “a counterattack against Dr. Luke.”115
Initially, “on or about June 30, 2021” Judge Schecter granted Kesha leave to
assert a counterclaim under the new statute, presumably agreeing with a
federal district court decision favoring the N.Y. Times in a SLAPP suit filed
by Sarah Palin that stated: “It is clear that § 76-a is a remedial statute that
should be given retroactive effect.”116 However, an appellate panel
reversed Schecter’s order on March 20, 2022, deciding that the new statute

112. See Aswad, supra note 110 (noting evidence of Dr. Luke’s unclean hands); see also supra notes
90–98.
113. Aswad, supra note 110. Cf. David Goguen, J.D., What are ‘Intervening’ and ‘Superseding’ Causes
in a Personal Injury Case, NOLO, https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/what-are-intervening-andsuperseding-causes-in-a-personal-injury-case.html
[https://perma.cc/XP5J-63FF]
(defining
“intervening” and “superseding” causes).
114. Gottwald v. Sebert, 2016 N.Y. Mic. LEXIS 5202, at *12 n.6 (noting that the main reason
why Kesha could not dissolve her business relationship with Dr. Luke through a preliminary injunction
was to preserve big business, because “it is commercially unreasonable for the SONY entities, having
expended more than $11 million in the U.S. and up to $20 million internationally, and willing to spend
more millions, not to promote Kesha’s albums”—the court actually appeared to perceive its initial
denial of Kesha’s freedom as a financial favor to her career, as if it couldn’t reform the contract to
address these things in favor of the party whose rights were violated); Hilary Weaver, Ties Revealed
Between Sony and Judge Who Threw Out Kesha’s Claims of Abuse [Updated], VANITY FAIR (Aug. 26, 2016),
https://www.vanityfair.com/style/2016/08/kesha-ties-revealed-judge-sony-music.
115. N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 70-a (enacted in November of 2020); Eriq Gardner, Kesha Seizes
on New Free Speech Law for Counterattack Against Dr. Luke, HOLLYWOOD RPTR. (Apr. 7, 2021, 2:16 PM),
https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/business/business-news/kesha-seizes-on-new-free-speechlaw-for-counterattack-against-dr-luke-4162915/.
116. Gottwald v. Sebert, 2022 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 1489, at *1 (N.Y. App. Div. 2022) (noting
in the section for case history that Judge Schecter granted Kesha’s “motion for a ruling that Civil Rights
Law § 76-a applies to plaintiffs’ defamation claims against her and for leave to assert a counterclaim
against plaintiffs under Civil Rights Law § 70-a”); Palin v. N.Y. Times Co., 510 F.Supp.3d 21, 27
(S.D.N.Y. 2020). Sarah Palin’s suit was later tossed out on a motion for judgment as a matter of law
on March 1, 2022, when the court applied the heightened standard from the newly enacted N.Y. AntiSLAPP Statute. Palin v. N.Y. Times Co., 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36035, at *41–42, *81–82 (S.D.N.Y.
2022).
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would not “apply retroactively to pending claims such as the defamation
claims asserted by plaintiffs in this action.”117
Ultimately, however, it does not necessarily matter whether the antiSLAPP statute applies retroactively unless to reverse an express repeal of
the common law, because free speech rights preexist human laws and were
(theoretically at least) created by God or nature.118 The common law
contains protective maxims to help defend these preexisting free speech
rights of parties like Kesha without the need of positive laws to reiterate
them.119 However, legislatures have been known to support the common
law by codifying preexisting rights into laws like anti-SLAPP statutes that
are more immediately accessible than the abstruse treatises of Roger
Williams on the natural right of free speech that anticipated and defined the
proper objects of the First Amendment.120
American courts also began to modernize with Holmesian legal realism,
which tends to ignore the common law.121 The ancient common law
117. Gottwald v. Sebert, 2022 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 1489, at *1–4 (N.Y. App. Div. 2022),
disagreeing with Palin, 510 F.Supp.3d at 27; but see Bill Donahue, Kesha Lost a Big Ruling, But Now the Senator
Who
Wrote
the
Law
Says
That’s
Wrong,
BILLBOARD
(Apr.
21,
2022),
https://www.billboard.com/business/legal/kesha-dr-luke-new-york-free-speech-anti-slapp-law1235061797/ (“in an unusual brief filing this week, Sen. Brad Hoylman told the court that it got the
decision wrong and urged it to reconsider”).
118. U.S. CONST. amend. I; THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776);
WILLIAMS I, supra note 66, at 1, 11–13 (expounding the natural law origins of the First Amendment);
N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 70-a (“Nothing in this section shall affect or preclude the right of any party
to any recovery otherwise authorized by common law, or by statute, law or rule.”).
119. Entick v. Carrington (1765) 19 How. St. Tr. 1029, 1066 (Eng.) (using the common law to
defend free speech and thought in England, without a written constitution), extended by Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616, 626 (1886) (using preexiting English common law to define the express rights of
the U.S. Constitution); cf. Laura K. Donohue, The Original Fourth Amendment, 83 U. CHIC. L. REV. 1181,
1196–1207 (2016) (discussing Entick alongside Wilkes v. Wood and Leech v. Money, each of which
involved the common law’s defense of free speech in England by refusing to enforce libel laws).
120.
N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 70-a (expressly preserving “any recovery otherwise authorized
by common law”); U.S. CONST. amend. I; THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S.
1776); WILLIAMS I, supra note 66, at 1, 11–13 (expounding the natural law origins of the First
Amendment); cf. 3 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES *181–83 (demonstrating how positive laws can be
enacted to support the common law: “This Act having declared all monopolies to be void by the
common law, hath provided by this clause, that they shall be examined, heard, tried, and determined
in the Courts of the Common law according to the Common law, and not the Councell Table, Starchamber, Chancery, Exchequer chamber, or any other Court of like nature, but only according to the
Common laws of this Realm . . . .”).
121.
Victoria F. Nourse, Making Constitution Doctrine in a Realist Age, 145 U. PENN. L. REV.
1401, 1421–22 (1997); T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J.
955–60 (1987) (quoting Harlan Fiske Stone, The Common Law in the United States, 50 HARV. L. REV. 4,
10 (1936)) (noting Holmes as perhaps the first legal realist to propose a judicial duty of balancing costs
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nevertheless requires that statutes should be read to implicitly incorporate
preexisting common law terms and to extend preexisting common law rights
absent a clear negative stated in the text of the statute to effect a repeal.122
The Ninth Amendment, which reserves all preexisting natural rights to the
people, demonstrates how deeply the constitution’s framers nodded to this
common law conception of rights.123
The Ninth Amendment clarified that the framers did not intend the Bill
of Rights to be a limit on the rights previously enjoyed by the people, but
that the rights named in the constitution are a floor that the government
must not sink below.124 Even Hobbes thought human beings in a state
nature retained their right of free speech, but he contended that humans are
insane and through speaking they would only have disputes that would
inevitably devolve into absolute war.125 Hobbes took aim at Aristotle
specifically, and endeavored to point out every imperfection of human
virtue in order to show that through speech about imperfect justice and
other virtues human beings would inevitably cause a perfect war.126
Hobbes implied that humans were perfectionists, that we would not be
happy with virtues unless they attained absolute perfection, and by this
implication (which was very popular in the Puritanical context in which he

and benefits, and that Holmes was considered “the patron saint” of legal realism, a movement that
disparaged common law precedent as “‘dry sterile formalism’”).
122. Dr. Foster’s Case [1614] 11 Co. Rep. 56b, 62a–64b (Eng.); Milborn’s Case [1572] 7 Co.
Rep. 6b, 7a (Eng.); see JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES §§ 459–60 (citing to the common law maxim from Milborn’s Case “cessante legis prœmio, cessat et
ipsa lex”); THEODORE SEDGWICK, A TREATISE ON THE RULES WHICH GOVERN THE
INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 127 (1857)
(citing the common law maxim of statutory construction from Dr. Foster’s Case).
123. U.S. CONST. amend. IX; cf. Randy E. Barnett, Reconceiving the Ninth Amendment, 74 CORNELL
L. REV. 1, 11 (1988) (“There is no reason to suppose that these Federalists did no share the thenprevailing beliefs in rights antecedent to government. For example, the same James Wilson who used
a rights-powers argument in his vocal opposition to a bill of rights was an ardent adherent to natural
rights.”).
124. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776); U.S. CONST. amend. IX;
Barnett, supra note 123, at 31; O’Connor, They Often, supra note 45, at 388 (noting that “the Declaration
of Independence, for example, speaks of inalienable God-given rights, the abridgement of which
permits revolution”).
125. HOBBES, supra note 2, at 109 (noting that out of humanity’s attempts to speak and reason
with each other about virtues, that “Disputes, Controversies, and at last War” will inevitably arise,
which is “the condition of meer Nature”).
126. Id. at 105–09 (stating that Aristotle’s pro-slavery state of nature idea was “not only against
reason; but also against experience,” but also contending that humanity’s natural equality results in
absolute wars that eventually establish slavery “by consent of men”).
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existed) he attempted to breed cynicism for the human race.127 Like the
Puritans who laid waste to the English government with the help of printing
presses, he would see the rioters of January 6, 2021 as proof of concept.128
He would probably say that the First Amendment and the entire
government form established by the U.S. Constitution dangerously opens
the U.S. government to the preexisting state of nature, which is absolute war
and conquest and that it is just a matter of time until the Republic in America
implodes according to the unworkability of Montesquieu’s idealism.129
Hegel agreed with Hobbes when he expressed “that, as yet, there is no
real State in America.”130 Hegel guessed that eventually America would
devolve into a dispute between North and South that several antebellum
intellectuals took as a prophesy of the Civil War, and that out of this war a
real State would emerge based on the Hobbesian state of nature that
inevitably results in war and slavery.131 In other words, Hegel probably
banked on the idea that America would eventually abandon the Declaration
of Independence, which originally named us “the united States of
America,”132 and according to which America embraced Montesquieu’s
state of nature premised on liberty and peace whence good governments
could be established “from reflection and choice.”133
Despite fighting on the battlefield of Civil War to rebirth the Union
originally envisioned by the founders, Justice Holmes eventually joined

127. Id.; Patricia Springborg, Hobbes, Donne and the Virginia Company: Terra Nullius and ‘the Bulimia
of Dominium’, 36 HIST. POL. THOUGHT 113, 144 (2015) (noting that Hobbes’s “Virginia Company
experience and, specifically, lurid accounts of the Jamestown massacre, were probably the source of
his negative judgment of ‘savages of America’ characterizing the state of nature”).
128. RUSSELL, A HISTORY, supra note 1, at 547 (noting that “the prospect of” the English Civil
War strengthened Hobbes’s convictions “when his fears were realized”).
129. HOBBES, supra note 2, at 105–09; 1 BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS
3–4 (Thomas Nugent Trans., 1899) (citing and disagreeing with Hobbes by asserting that the state of
nature is liberty and peace); HANNAH ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 150 (1990) (noting that
Montesquieu’s “role in the American Revolution almost equals Rousseau’s influence on the course of
the French Revolution”).
130. RUSSELL, A HISTORY, supra note 1, at 739; id. at 741 (noting that Hegel eventually “fall[s]
back on the state of nature and Hobbes’s war of all against all”).
131. Id. at 550 (describing Hobbes’s state of nature); id. at 739, 741 (noting Hegel’s embrace of
the Hobbesian state of nature); MONTESQUIEU, supra note 129, at 3–4 (observing Hobbes’s state of
nature was one of absolute slavery and war).
132. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE paras. 1, 32 (U.S. 1776).
133. THE FEDERALIST NO. 1 (Alexander Hamilton); THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE
paras. 1–2 (U.S. 1776) (“assum[ing] among the powers of the earth, the separate and equal station to
which the Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God entitle them”); MONTESQUIEU, supra note 129, at 3–
4.
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Hegel and while on the bench he disparaged the idea of preexisting rights,
i.e., the rights that preexist governments embodied in the Declaration of
Independence.134 He was raised by poets as his father Holmes, Sr., was a
famed fireside poet,135 and thus Holmes, Jr., may have drawn close to
Hegel’s mystical assertion that poetry “becomes at the end once more what
she was in the beginning: the teacher of mankind.”136 Under the influence of
Emerson, Holmes proceeded to write a jurisprudence that was a far more
poetic tribute to despotism than Hegel’s writings ever were.137
Enough is wrong with Holmes’s jurisprudence that lawyers ought not to
follow it blindly, but Holmes’s lifelong attempts to engage with the arts
opened a door to his salvation.138 In fact, the New York Courts in Kesha’s
case could establish Kesha’s preexisting human rights by expanding upon
Justice Holmes’s own reasoning in Rice v. D’Arville.139 As Holmes generally
134. O’Connor, They Often, supra note 45, at 388 (noting that Holmes “disagreed quite strongly”
with the principle of pre-existing natural rights embodied by the Declaration of Independence);
Novick, supra note 2, at 722 (Holmes’s “ideas actually reflected an older version of evolution, most
strongly influenced by Hegel”).
135. Novick, supra note 2, at 707–10 (“Despite Holmes’s determination to pursue philosophy
(and art), his father made it plain that he would have to earn a living, and Holmes trained for the bar.”);
Geoffrey Kirsch, Poetic Justice: Oliver Wendell Holmes’s Life in Law and Letters, LARB (Aug. 27, 2019),
https://lareviewofbooks.org/article/poetic-justice-oliver-wendell-holmess-life-in-law-and-letters/
(“Holmes carried the ‘literary amateur’ label his entire life, and not merely because people confused
him with his celebrity father.”).
136. GLENN ALEXANDER MAGEE, HEGEL AND THE HERMETIC TRADITION 91 (2001)
(quoting and intelligibly explaining G.W.F. Hegel’s System-Program) (internal quotation marks omitted);
Hines, supra note 12, at 47.
137. MAGEE, supra note 136, at 91 (noting that Hegel was “not recommending that philosophers
write poetry, or even that they incorporate poetic elements into their work”); Hines, supra note 12, at
47 (noting that “under Emerson’s definition, much of Holmes’ work would qualify as poetry”); id. at
42–43 (“Holmes’ decision in Buck v. Bell (1927) embodied an Emersonian premium on self-reliance.”).
138. See, e.g., Hines, supra note 12, at 40–45 (admiring Justice Holmes’s poetic jurisprudence);
Kirsch, supra note 135 (explaining Holmes’s poetic inspirations). Similarly to how Holmes’s interest in
poetry and art may help Kesha, the revolutionary lawyer James Otis may have helped Phillis Wheatley
to correct the ways the Americans blindly accepted the errors of John Milton when Otis wrote his
piece The Rudiments of Latin Prosody, which was used by Harvard College as a text book around the time
Wheatley was sold at a Boston slave market; it is possible that Otis’s book initially aided Wheatley in
her studies of the classics and at the very least it seems to indicate that Otis was equipped to hear what
poets like Wheatley had to say. Schroeder, Leviathan, supra note 23, at 159–60 (“Against the blindness
of these men, Phillis Wheatley revolutionized Milton and became a better champion for the freedom
of mind than Milton’s lady ever was, abolishing any reason why Miltonic thought should disfranchise
her sex.”); see generally JAMES OTIS, THE RUDIMENTS OF LATIN PROSODY (1760).
139. Notes of Justice Holmes’s opinion in Rice v. D’Arville printed in Note: Lumley v. Wagner
Denied, 8 HARV. L. REV. 172, 172–73 (1894) (expanding upon Justice Holmes’s opinion: “In addition
to this may there not be a feeling against restraint of the personal liberty of the citizen? Doing personal
service because one is ordered to under the pains and penalties which a court of equity can inflict,

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol53/iss4/2

24

Schroeder: The Dark Side of Due Process: Part III
SCHROEDER III_STEP 5 (DO NOT DELETE)

2022]

THE DARK SIDE OF DUE PROCESS: PART III

12/10/2022 11:33 AM

953

preferred to discuss powers over rights, Kesha’s potential course correction
centering on D’Arville could begin with reference to Henry Wadsworth
Longfellow’s explanation of preexisting powers here:
Nature is a revelation of God; Art a revelation of man. Indeed, Art signifies
no more than this. Art is Power. That is the original meaning of the word. It
is the creative power by which the soul of man makes itself known, through
some external manifestation or outward sign.140

As observed by Longfellow, Kesha is learning to reclaim creative control
over her own art as a preexisting power coeval with her existence as a human
being.141 According to her reclamation of this preexisting power, Dr. Luke
already lost everything worth owning and is now perhaps, as far as Kesha is
concerned, a mere leech on her profits.142 The courts, in the meantime,
appear both unaware and unconcerned about what happens if good people
stop considering the court helpful to securing justice, as would-be litigants
might be tempted to turn to methods of self-help instead.143
This risk is why Justice Holmes fell short when he taught the court to
consider only how a “bad man” in the shoes of a party like Kesha sees the

seems dangerously like temporary slavery. And might not a court well say, ‘This is too much to give,
whether or not we can do it, even to one who asks for the letter of his bond.’”); Rice v. D’Arville, 162
Mass. 559, 560–61 (1895) (distinguishing Lumley v. Wagner and affirming the defendant’s contractual
repudiation and her decision to find employment elsewhere); cf. VanderVelde, supra note 75, at 838
n.335 (examining Holmes’s beneficial reasoning in D’Arville in light of his contradictory reasoning in
Bailey v. Alabama).
140. HENRY WADSWORTH LONGFELLOW, HYPERION 228–29 (13th ed., 1853) [1839].
141. Id.; McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 315, 406 (1819) (citing U.S. CONST. amend. X) ("But
there is no phrase in the [constitution that] . . . excludes incidental or implied powers and which requires
that everything granted shall be expressly and minutely described. Even the 10th Amendment, which
was framed for the purpose of quieting the excessive jealousies which had been excited, omits the word
'expressly,' and declares only that the powers 'not delegated to the United States, nor prohibited to the
States, are reserved to the States or to the people' . . . ."); see Spencer Kornhaber, Kesha’s Vital Public
Relations
Victory,
THE
ATLANTIC
(Feb. 23,
2016),
https://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2016/02/keshas-vital-public-relationsvictory/470484/ [https://perma.cc/XKD8-PPTJ] [hereinafter Kornhaber, Kesha’s Vital] (detailing
support for Kesha, despite the outcome of her lawsuit); Spencer Kornhaber, Kesha’s Comeback Message:
Love
Your
Enemy,
THE
ATLANTIC
(July 6,
2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2017/07/kesha-praying-comeback-messagedr-luke/532773/ [https://perma.cc/N8TL-SGYX] [hereinafter Kornhaber, Kesha’s Comeback].
142. Cf. Eriq Gardner, Dr. Luke Is No Longer the CEO of Sony’s Kemosabe Records Amid Kesha Legal
Saga, BILLBOARD (Apr. 25, 2017), https://www.billboard.com/articles/news/7775107/dr-luke-sonysplit-kesha [https://perma.cc/VBW8-YDQN].
143. See supra notes 90–98 and accompanying text.
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law in order to outthink bad people.144 It is nothing personal to Kesha for
the court to avoid making precedents that could be abused by frauds to get
more favorable terms in their record contracts.145 But it is a gaping
insufficiency in Holmesian jurisprudence that a case should end with cutting
off the bad without considering what should happen to the good, because
it potentially leaves no room for justice.146
Hobbes, Hegel, and Holmes would say that justice is a virtue that
imperfect humans cannot hope to grasp, and Hobbes especially contended
that proceeding to discuss justice will simply devolve into petty disputes that
finally end in absolute war.147 The American Revolutionaries disagreed
when they waged a war to establish a just system of government.148 The
idea of justice, they contended, along with the idea of preexisting human
rights could justify wars waged by people to sever ties with unjust
systems.149 But once the United States made itself independent, several
years of relative peace passed where the founders established a government
based on the consent of the governed.150
144. Holmes, Jr., The Path, supra note 12, at 459.
145. See, e.g., Gottwald v. Sebert, 2016 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 5202, at *26 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2016)
(interpreting the law to avoid a situation where a woman could claim rape was a gender-motivated hate
crime in an attempt to reform or strike their business contracts with the employers they claim facilitated
the alleged rape).
146. Compare id., with HOLMES, JR., supra note 68, at 42–43 (expressing that “probably most
English-speaking lawyers would accept . . . without hesitation” that the infliction of criminal
punishment “is only a means to an end,” regardless of the fact that this theory seems to “conflict with
the sense of justice, and to violate the fundamental principle of all free communities, that the members
of such communities have equal rights to life, liberty, and personal security”); id. at 46–47 (“the law
does undoubtedly treat the individual as a means to an end, and uses him as a tool to increase the
general welfare at his own expense”).
147. HOBBES, supra note 2, at 109, followed by G.W.F. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 124 (S.W.
Dyde trans., 2001) (“To this place belongs the famous sentence, ‘The end justifies the means.’”), followed
by HOLMES, JR., supra note 68, at 42–43, 46–47 (citing generally to Hegel and endorsing the idea that
the ends justify the means regardless of whether it serves justice); cf. RUSSELL, A HISTORY, supra note 1,
at 741 (noting how Hegel fell “back on the state of nature and Hobbes’s war of all against all”); id. at
743–44 (noting how Hegel failed to “take account of the distinction between ends and means”).
148. U.S. CONST. pmbl. (noting that one of the basic purpose of forming the U.S. government
was to “establish Justice”).
149. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE paras. 1, 31 (U.S. 1776) (naming “the voice of
justice” to support the decision to “dissolve the political bands” that connected the peoples of America
with Great Britain); id. at para. 10 (blaming the king for obstructing justice in America).
150. Id. at para. 2 (“to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving
their just powers from the consent of the governed”); see 1 JAMES WILSON, COLLECTED WORKS OF
JAMES WILSON 643 (Kermit L. Hall & Mark David Hall ed., 2007) (noting that during the founding
era the natural right of “unrestrained emigration” is whence the founders derived “the consent of every
citizen to its institution and government”).
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According to the revolutionaries, what a good person thinks mattered—
it mattered if justice was served, and if preexisting rights to liberty were
respected.151 The reason it mattered to them was that they were aware that
the same terms they used to separate from England could be used to justify
a revolution against them.152 They knew that when good people experience
a violation of their rights and find all their attempts to vindicate justice
disappointed by the prevailing system of government, that justice itself
might support the unrest, violence, and revolution that may follow.153
Therefore, in order to avoid unrest, common law due process should be
observed by the judiciary looking forward to ensure that anyone in Kesha’s
situation could seek to duly reform or wind down their contracts in such a
way that respects the preexisting rights of all parties.154 Kesha herself is
using her musical platform to assure the public that respecting her rights will
not cause the violent disarray that Hobbes, Hegel, and Holmes feared.155
Rather, Kesha picked up on one of Phillis Wheatley’s most anti-Hobbesian
themes in her song Shadow, regarding her unique expression of love for her
enemies:
So get your shadow out of my sunshine
Out of my blue skies, out of my good times
So get your darkness out of my champagne
I’ll be dancing in the rain
I’ma love you even though you hate me
I’ma love you even though you hate me156

151. U.S. CONST. amend. IX (expressly protecting preexisting, unenumerated rights).
152. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776); see Letter from Thomas
Boylston Adams to Abigail Adams (Aug. 10, 1793) (“If such things do not destroy our Government it
will be because we have none to fall a sacrifice. Like the City of Paris however in the heighth of their
Massacres, we are said to be in perfect tranquility; and because the consequences are not immediate,
nobody appears alarmed.”).
153. Letter from John Adams to Thomas Jefferson (June 30, 1813) (remembering “the
terrorism of a former day” when “ten thousand People in the Streets of Philadelphia, day after day,
threatened to drag Washington out of his House, and effect a Revolution in the Government, or
compell it to declare War in favour of the French Revolution, and against England”).
154. Eisenberg, The Bargain, supra note 103, at 774–75; see JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 459–60 (demonstrating how to use common law
canons of statutory construction to construe the constitution in the light of its preamble).
155. Kornhaber, Kesha’s Comeback, supra note 141 (speaking of Kesha’s song Praying: “For all the
bitterness in her voice, this is a call to love your enemies, even if, as she sings, ‘some things, only God
can forgive.’”).
156. KESHA, Shadow, on HIGH ROAD (Sony 2020).
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According to Hobbes and his progeny, loving one’s enemies is
impossible.157 If it were possible for people in a state of nature to disagree
about virtues and have arguments proving the imperfections of human
ideals, while still deciding at the end of the day to love one another then the
inevitability of Hobbes’s state of nature is impossible.158 Hobbes’s entire
theory of government hangs on the inevitability of absolute wars flowing
from natural rights, like the freedom of speech.159 But Kesha, as an heir of
Phillis Wheatley’s spirit of an overarching love for her enemies, offers us a
high road; an alternative with a promise that if she can love Dr. Luke and
his kind even now (albeit from a distance), that there is still hope for us
imperfect humans.160
Few contractual details between Sony, Kemosabe Records, Dr. Luke, and
Kesha are public, and their business relationships appear to have morphed
since the start of litigation.161 But Kesha’s preexisting rights to express love
for her enemies,162 and manage her own work life,163 could still have broad
application beyond helping her disassociate with Dr. Luke.164 Kesha can
seek to challenge any conveyances of her labor and property, including

157. HOBBES, supra note 2, at 109 (asserting that absolute war is the inevitable consequence of
letting people freely express their opinions about virtues like justice); see Teresa M. Bejan, Hobbes against
hate speech, BRIT. J. HIST. PHIL. 1, 1–2 (2022), https://doi.org/10.1080/09608788.2022.2027340 (citing
and quoting HOBBES, supra note 2, at 104) (“Thomas Hobbes argued directly for the legal proscription
of ‘contumely’ or insult—which he defined as inclusively as any expression of hatred or contempt, by
word or deed—as a demand of natural law.”).
158. Compare HOBBES, supra note 2, at 109 (stating that war is the inevitable consequence of
free expression regarding the virtues), with KESHA, Shadow, on HIGH ROAD (Sony 2020) (expressing
love for her enemies).
159. HOBBES, supra note 2, at 109.
160. Compare Letter from Phillis Wheatley to Samson Occom (Mar. 11, 1774) (addressing
slaveholders and stating “I desire not for their hurt”), with KESHA, Shadow, on HIGH ROAD (Sony 2020).
161. Richard S. He, How Do You Solve A Problem Like Dr. Luke, JUNKEE,
https://junkee.com/longform/dr-luke-boycott-cancellation (giving probably the closest possible look
into the four-way business situation that is almost entirely kept private).
162. Kesha’s right to love her enemies is both a free speech right and a religious liberty right.
U.S. CONST. amend. I; WILLIAMS I, supra note 66, at 1, 11–13; Matthew 5:44 (“love your enemies and
pray for those who persecute you”); see, e.g., Letter from Phillis Wheatley to Samson Occom (Mar. 11,
1774) (demonstrating that Wheatley desired not to hurt her enemies, but to love them better).
163. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIII, XIV; 3 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES *181–83.
164. Compare VanderVelde, supra note 75, at 799 (citing Ford v. Jermon, 6 Phila. 6 (Dist. Ct.
1865) and providing a comparison of labor laws and slavery), with 3 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES
*181–83 (arguing a person’s right to be free of “monopolies”).
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copyright in her songs, as not only voidable, but void if they violated any of
Kesha’s preexisting rights in the conveyance.165
The root of copyright law in the right of life, as observed by the Case of
Monopolies and beyond, confirms Kesha’s assertion of preexisting rights are
not a mess of straws that she is hopelessly grasping for.166 Kesha’s
preexisting rights arise from a unified common law conception of
preexisting, natural rights as expressed by Lord Coke in his Institutes: “Thou
shalt not take the nether or upper milstone to pledge, for he taketh a mans
life to pledge.”167 Coke continued, “it appeareth that a mans trade is
accounted his life, because it maintaineth his life; and therefore the
monopolist that taketh away a mans trade, taketh away his life, and therefore
is so much the more odious.”168
We may justly imagine Lord Coke standing with Kesha against the
powerful forces at any billion dollar entertainment company to say:
“Against these Inventers and Propounders of evil things, the holy ghost hath
spoken, Inventores malorum, &c. digni sunt morte.”169 Coke’s stand
against the king’s abuse of the lives of the English people through the feudal
issuance of patents in the Star Chamber and like courts formed the
ideological root of the first IP law, the first antitrust law, the first habeas
corpus statute, and a nascent understanding of the separation of powers
itself.170 A judicial recognition of the long established preexisting rights of
life in America on behalf of Kesha would not be extravagant; it would simply
mark the minimum common law basis that was enjoyed by the founding
165. See Melissa Yang, Void Versus Voidable Contracts: The Subtle Distinction That Can Affect GoodFaith Purchasers’ Title to Goods, 19 NY LITIGATOR 31 (2014) (indicating the legal principles that the court
may consider to decide whether a contract transferring Kesha’s copyrights to Sony is void); Eisenberg,
The Bargain, supra note 103, at 774–75 (discussing unconscionability and undue influence); cf.
VanderVelde, supra note 75, at 490 n.68 (noting the terms of the Fugitive Slave Clause, which was later
amended by the Thirteenth Amendment, that originally endorsed the inescapability of employment
contracts including those that created indentured servitude and slavery).
166. Schroeder, Leviathan, supra note 23, at 274 (quoting 3 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES *181).
167. 3 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES *181.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 181–84 (citing Statute of Monopolies 1623, 21 Jac. 1, c. 3 (Eng.) (the first IP law and
antitrust law, but in England “antitrust law” is usually known by the term “competition law”)); Habeas
Corpus Act 1640, 16 Car. I c. 10 (Eng.) (abolishing the Star Chamber and like courts after the crown
refused to stop issuing monopolies by patent to non-inventors despite the Case and Statute of Monopolies);
Schroeder, Leviathan, supra note 23, at 170, 256 (noting how Phillis Wheatley’s completion of “a
revolution begun by Edward Coke and John Milton in England to create copyright and patent law into
a common law of the land in America” summed up the connections between these basic principles of
law, including the nascent English conception of the separation of powers).
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poetess and businesswoman Phillis Wheatley herself, who sold her works to
the American public for a profit in order to inspire the adoption of “life,
liberty, and property” for everyone.171
B. RENEWING THE REVOLUTIONARY DISTINCTION BETWEEN RIGHTS
AND POWERS
Mathews papered over the feudal and canon law presupposition of a
government interest in demolishing, curtailing, removing, or ignoring legally
mandated human rights.172 According to the Declaration of Independence,
it is never in the government’s interest to demolish rights, and it is always in
the government’s interest to secure rights.173 Legal rights set forth by
positive laws are not natural rights, but they may secure preexisting natural
or common law rights.174
The idea that the government created disability rights, rather than merely
securing them, greased the hinges of a door to feudal law that Mathews swung
open.175 As revealed by the leaked draft opinion in Dobbs v. Jackson Women's
171. Schroeder, Leviathan, supra note 23, at 210 (“The right of authorial attribution is Phillis
Wheatley’s right to make a living; i.e., the very right of life and the primary policy goal defended by
Coke’s vision of antitrust law.”); THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776); U.S.
CONST. amends. I, V, XIV; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6. See, e.g., Letter from Phillis Wheatley to Samson
Occom (Mar. 11, 1774) (hoping to correct the ironies of avaricious men). Compare Hannah Yasharoff,
Read Britney Spears’ Full Statement From Her Conservatorship Hearing: ‘I am traumatized’, USA TODAY
(June 24, 2021, 11:16 AM) https://www.usatoday.com/story/entertainment/celebrities/2021/
06/24/britney-spears-full-statement-conservatorship-hearing/5333532001/ [https://perma.cc/T42S9FF5] (discussing the general details of Brittany Spears’s Conservatorship), with Thomas Hutchinson,
C.J., et al., To the Public, [Oct. 1772,] in PHILLIS WHEATLEY, POEMS ON VARIOUS SUBJECTS,
RELIGIOUS AND MORAL 7 (1773) (beginning the American tradition of author owned copyrights),
extended by U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. See generally VanderVelde, supra note 75 (describing liberty
interests that are tied up in entertainment law contracts for personal services); Zelaya, supra note 15
(explaining how Wheatley staged her cause of freedom by working as poet).
172. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 349 (1976) (deciding that the termination of property
rights without “an evidentiary hearing . . . fully comport[s] with due process”).
173. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776); U.S. CONST. pmbl. (noting
that the purpose of ratifying the U.S. Constitution was to “secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves
and our Posterity”).
174. See, e.g., 3 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES *181–83 (explaining how the rights enacted by the
Statute of Monopolies were the same common law rights originally recognized in the Case of Monopolies,
and how the statute represented Parliament’s requirement that common law rights of life (later
enumerated in the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution) be applied to regulate monopolies rather
than feudal or canon law); cf. U.S. CONST. amend. I (extending preexisting rights); WILLIAMS I, supra
note 66, at 1, 11–13 (declaring the freedoms of speech, assembly, and religion were natural rights
granted by God, before it was secured by compacts, written constitutions, and positive laws).
175. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 332 (citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261–62 (1970)); see, e.g.,
Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Org., No 19-1392 unofficial leaked 1st draft opinion 18 (2022)
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Health Organization purporting to overrule Roe v. Wade and Casey v. Planned
Parenthood, the Mathews balancing regime mentally prepared the court to
demolish the previously held common law view of due process regarding
the preexisting rights and liberties of the people..176 Under Mathews, the
Court no longer inquires about preexisting common law and natural rights
even when positive laws are enacted to secure them.177
The difference between a common law theory of human rights that
protects all humans and a penumbral theory of the United States
Constitution to protect only certain classes of individuals can be difficult to
discern.178 In the founding era, the distinction existed in the legal and
constitutional disagreements that arose between American and English
jurists regarding the important difference between power and right
recounted by Justice James Wilson:
It is very true—we ought to “distinguish between right and power:” but I
always apprehended, that the true use of this distinction was, to show that
power, in opposition to right, was devested of every title, not that it was
clothed with the strongest title, to obedience.179

(citing problematic pre-revolutionary English cases like Regina v. Webb as controlling common law,
without considering whether they are corrupted with illegitimate feudalism and without acknowledging
the role the ancient common law writ of trespass on the case by which the common law gradually
acknowledged preexisting rights not previously known to or acknowledged by the law).
176. Id.; Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Org., No. 19-1392 unofficial leaked 1st draft
opinion 31–32, 56 (2022) (using Chief Justice Roberts's "deciding vote" in June Medical rejecting
cost/benefit balancing to disparage the preexisting human rights to interracial marriage, to marry while
in prison, to obtain contraception, to reside with relatives, to make decisions about the education of
one's children, to not be sterilized without consent, to not undergo involuntary surgery, to avoid the
forced administration of drugs, to enegage in private, consensual sexual acts, and the right to marry a
person of the same sex as back door into "rights to illicit drug use, prostitution, and the like," by
inappropriately comparing these rights generally and collectively to the specific and very controversial
right to commit suicide).
177. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 332 (giving a rationale that ostensibly recognizes all preexisting
rights as the same, sidestepping a need to delineate new and distinct rights, while allowing ad hoc
decisions to issue that can potentially strip all property rights of pre-termination evidentiary hearings).
178. Compare Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (expounding “penumbral rights
of ‘privacy and repose’”), with id. at 488–93 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (citing U.S. CONST. amend. IX
to evince the framers’ intention “that the first eight amendments [should not] be construed to exhaust
the basic and fundamental rights which the Constitution guaranteed to the people”).
179. 1 WILSON, supra note 150, at 740; cf. Victoria Nourse, Buck v. Bell: A Constitutional Tragedy
from a Lost World, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 101, 109 (2011) [hereinafter Nourse, Buck] (noting that “an astute
student will recognize that Holmes’s facts assume the single most important constitutional rule of the
day—one of power, not right”).
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The difference between power and right in England was used by Sir William
Blackstone to justify an idea that human rights are “subversive of all
government.”180 Human rights, according to the English theory of
statecraft, resisted by Justice Wilson above, were all surrendered to the
Crown in exchange for security according to the Crown’s right of
conquest.181 Theoretically, any legally relevant rights retained by English
people after entering civilized society were solely derived by grant of the
Crown through positive laws.182
Justice Holmes disagreed with Justice Wilson because Justice Wilson
interpreted substantive human rights arising from facts as the basis for all
procedure and law.183 According to Wilson, if rights are opposed by any
power, clothed in whatever procedure or law, such powers, procedures, or
laws are ultra vires and devested of the title of “law” or “procedure.”184
Chauvinist to the core, Justice Holmes maligned the founding distinction
between rights and powers as feminine, cross-dressing, weakling, and a
source of sheer embarrassment.185
180. 1 WILSON, supra note 150, at 740 (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
*91) (“The successor of Sir William Blackstone in the Vinerian chair walks in his footsteps.”).
181. Campbell v. Hall [1774] 98 Eng. Rep. 1045, 1048 (Eng.) (“It is left by the constitution to
the King’s authority to grant or refuse a capitulation: if he refuses, and puts the inhabitants to the sword
or exterminates them, all the lands belong to him. If he receives the inhabitants under his protection
and grants them their property, he has a power to fix such terms and conditions as he thinks is proper.”) (emphasis
added); cf. Barbara A. Black, The Constitution of Empire: The Case for the Colonists, 124 U. PENN. L. REV.
1157, 1180, 1206 (1976) (explaining how the Crown’s right of conquest became the Parliament’s right
of conquest).
182. Campbell, 98 Eng. Rep. at 1048. But see 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *17
(noting that the “ancient collection of unwritten maxims and customs, which is called the common
law, however compounded or from whatever fountains derived, had subsisted immemorially in this
kingdom; and, though somewhat altered and impaired by the violence of the times, had in great
measure weathered the rude shock of the Norman conquest”).
183. Compare 1 WILSON, supra note 150, at 740, and U.S. CONST. amend. IX (protecting
unenumerated individual rights), with Holmes, Natural Law, supra note 1, at 41–42 (characterizing the
notion of natural and preexisting rights as “naïve” and “arbitrary,” and describing a right as “only the
hypostasis of a prophecy”), and Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927) (disrespecting the natural rights
of Carrie Buck). Cf. Nourse, Buck, supra note 179, at 109 (noting that in Buck Holmes preferred power
over right); James R. Zink, James Wilson Versus the Bill of Rights: Progress, Popular Sovereignty, and the Idea of
the U.S. Constitution, 67 POL. RSCH. Q. 253, 263 (2014) (explaining Wilson’s view that a constitutional
bill of rights would stunt the progression and public discourse on natural rights); Leslie W. Dunbar,
James Madison and the Ninth Amendment, 42 VA. L. REV. 627, 629–30 (1956) (noting how “[t]he HamiltonWilson thesis” convinced James Madison to include the Ninth Amendment).
184. 1 WILSON, supra note 150, at 740.
185. Nourse, Buck, supra note 179, at 109–12 (observing Holmes’s direct opposition with the
founding distinction between right and power resulted in Buck); John Kang, The Soldier and the Imbecile:
How Holmes’s Manliness Fated Carrie Buck, 47 AKRON L. REV. 1055, 1063 (2015) (“effeminacy for
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The English position amounted to the rule of legal positivism underlying
Holmes and Brandeis’ exceptions to state police powers delineated by a
penumbra.186 It was the very same position of Lord Camden in Entick v.
Carrington,187 which inspired Justice Brandeis’ Olmstead v. United States
dissent.188 The sentiment of Camden was expressed in Entick thusly: “If it
is law, it will be found in our books. If it is not to be found there, it is not
law.”189
Like Lord Camden, Holmes and Brandeis did not intend to apply rights
from the bench outside those enumerated in “our books”—but this rule is
given by Lord Camden in England and was not in American law books until
Boyd v. United States reached outside of American law books to put it
there.190 The century long debate of how many rights could be indulged in
the shadows of the words of our law books, was technically British.191 Lord
Camden’s opinion makes little sense in the United States, where our law
books begin with the Declaration of Independence, which “has accordingly
always been treated as an act of paramount and sovereign authority.”192
Holmes was a vice stuffed with narcissism, materialism, and sloth”); id. at 1068–70 (“By comparing
Carrie’s abject need for care with the soldier’s courageous sacrifice, Holmes could treat her with moral
contempt, something that was not forbidden in a universe where, Holmes said, creeds, including creeds
founded on empathy, could ‘collapse.’”). The reason Holmes was so passionately against the judicial
recognition of human rights and was so obviously for the centralization of state power was his
association of human rights with weakness and his association of power with strength. See Holmes,
Natural Law, supra note 1, at 41–42 (disparaging the natural right of humans to live by commenting that
even “a very tender-hearted judge” would justify the deaths of a few for the greater good); Holmes,
Law in Science, supra note 1, at 457 (characterizing the jury as an escape hatch for effeminate judges who
“avow[] [their] inability to state the law”); O’Connor, They Often, supra note 45, at 389 (presenting
Holmes’ idea that human rights were “no more than a romantic ideal with no place in the rough and
tumble world”); John M. Kang, Prove Yourselves: Oliver Wendell Holmes and the Obsessions of Manliness,
118 W. VA. L. REV. 1067, 1080 (2016) (noting that Holmes “was obsessed with . . . the longing to
obtain manliness”).
186. See Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 469 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (revealing his hesitancy to agree that
the Fourth and Fifth Amendments’ penumbrae covered the defendant); H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the
Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 594 (1957); cf. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *161 (presenting the English theory of Parliamentary omnipotence, which was
objectively disproven by the American Revolution).
187. Entick v. Carrington [1765] 19 How. St. Tr. 1029 (Eng.).
188. Id. at 1066, quoted by Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 474–75 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
189. Entick, 19 How. St. Tr. at 1066.
190. Id., quoted by Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 627 (1886) (using Entick to define what
the Fourth Amendment “meant by unreasonable searches and seizures”).
191. Id.
192. 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 211 (noting that “the colonies did not severally act for themselves and proclaim their own
independence” and stating that “the declaration of independence of all the colonies was the united act
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The things that Boyd imported from Entick, that inspired Brandeis, were
probably holdings repeated from Lord Coke in The Case of Proclamations.193
They stated that the common law did not support inherent executive powers
or general warrants, but that illegitimate general warrants arose from the
feudal laws of the Star Chamber and Privy Council as observed by Lord
Camden here:
But there did exist a search warrant, which took its rise from a decree of the
Star Chamber. . . . By this decree the messenger of the press was empowered
to search in all places, where books were printing, in order to see if the printer
had a license; and if upon such search he found an books which he suspected
to be libellous against the church or state, he was to seize them, and carry
them before the proper magistrate. . . . I do very much suspect that the
present warrant took its rise from these search warrants that I have been
describing. . . .194

Lord Camden surmised that unless a positive law or common law supported
the executive’s search or seizure, it was a plain trespass.195 Upon an honest
search through the centuries of English common law that Camden
conducted shortly after the historical search James Otis conducted while

of all . . . . It was emphatically the act of the whole people of the united colonies . . . . It was an act of
original sovereignty by the people themselves, resulting from their right to change the form of
government, and to institute a new one, whenever necessary for their safety and happiness. . . . No
State had presumed of itself to form a new government, or to provide for the exigencies of the times,
without consulting Congress on the subject; and when any acted, it was in pursuance of the
recommendation of Congress. It was, therefore, the achievement of the whole for the benefit of the
whole.”); THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (establishing the fundamental
principles of statecraft by which the U.S. Constitution and all the State Constitutions would be drafted
and ratified); Schroeder, Leviathan, supra note 23, at 13 (quoting Sandra Day O’Connor, The Judiciary Act
of 1789 and the American Judicial Tradition, 59 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 3 (1990)) (recognizing that the
Declaration of Independence is the first of “the triad of founding documents”); cf. ARENDT, supra note
129, at 11, 213–14 (quoting THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776)) (defining
“beginning” and “principle” as synonyms, and noting that the beginning of the United States was the
American Revolution marked by the Declaration of Independence, and noting that, perhaps, the
beginning of the United States in 1776 may also point back to “the beginning of history” itself saying
“no cause is left but the most ancient of all”).
193. Compare Entick, 19 How. St. Tr. at 1066, with The Case of Proclamations [1610] 12 Co. Rep.
74, 76 (Eng.) (“[T]he King hath no Prerogative, but that which the Law of the Land allows him.”).
194. Entick, 19 How. St. Tr. at 1069–70.
195. Id. at 1063 (“If he had no such jurisdiction, the law is clear, that the officers are as much
responsible for the trespass as their superior.”). See Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. 170, 179 (1804) (“[T]he
[presidential] instructions cannot change the nature of the transaction or legalize an act which without
those instructions would have been a plain trespass.”).
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leading the American Revolutionaries in Paxton’s Case,196 Lord Camden
only seemed to find Star Chamber precedent for general search warrants,
which he honorably rejected as illegal.197
While no positive law existed to justify general warrants in England,
American Colonies suffered under positive laws authorizing writs of
assistance in America.198 The English Navigation Acts allowed Admiralty
Courts to issue writs of assistance that were a particularly degrading form of
general warrant (i.e., a warrant that lacks particularity about the people,
things, and places to be searched and seized).199 Lord Camden’s opinion
in Entick echoed James Otis’s appeal to the common law that “a man’s
house is his castle,”200 but Entick was not enough to help the Americans
because it did not end the use of general warrants authorized by law outside
the physical borders of England.201 The founders of the United States,
therefore, appealed to Lord Coke’s decision in Dr. Bonham’s Case.202
196. See generally PARKER P. SIMMONS, JAMES OTIS’S SPEECH ON THE WRITS OF
ASSISTANCE 1761 (Albert Bushnell Hart & Edward Channing eds., 1906).
197. Entick, 19 How. St. Tr. at 1069–70.
198. SIMMONS, supra note 196, at 2–5; see id. at 12, 20 (noting that the English Navigation Acts
were “a plagiarism from Oliver Cromwell”); An Act for increase of Shipping, and Encouragement of the
Navigation of this Nation, [Oct. 9, 1651], in 2 ACTS & ORDS. INTERREGNUM 559–62 (C.H. Firth & R.S.
Rait eds., 1911) [hereinafter ACTS]; The Navigation Act 1660, 12 Car. 2 c. 18 (Eng.).
199. Supra note 198; Oliver Cromwell, Underneath—Writ of Assistance (May 9, 1648), in 3
THOMAS CARLYLE, THE LETTERS AND SPEECHES OF OLIVER CROMWELL 385 (S. C. Lomas ed.,
1904); see Schroeder, Leviathan, supra note 23, at 139 n.792 (explaining the possible origins for the writ
in Cromwell’s dictatorship and the reasons why it was particularly degrading).
200. 3 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES *162; SIMMONS, supra note 196, at 4 (in Paxton’s Case James
Otis was reported to have spoken: “This Writ is against the fundamental Principles of Law.—The
Privilege of House. A Man, who is quiet, is as secure in his House, as a Prince in his Castle . . . .”);
Entick, 19 How. St. Tr. at 1064 (noting that general warrants within England “is not supported by one
single citation from any law book extant,” but also observing “such warrants” were “issued frequently”
in England at the time); Donohue, supra note 119, at 1204 (noting that in response to Entick and other
general warrant cases that English newspapers reported that it was affirmed within England “‘every
Englishman[’s] . . . house is his castle’”); cf. id. at 1208 (noting that the idea that a man’s house is his
castle originally came from Lord Coke’s opinion in Semayne’s Case).
201. Entick, 19 How. St. Tr. at 1069–70. At the same time Lord Camden was shoring up
English rights in Entick and other cases, Lord Mansfield was excluding Americans from those very
same rights. Campbell v. Hall [1774] 98 Eng. Rep. 1045, 1047 (Eng.) (establishing a geographic
limitation for English rights: “An Englishman in Ireland, Minorca, the Isle of Man, or the plantations
[in America], has no privilege distinct from the natives.”); ADAMS, THE REVOLUTIONARY, supra note
26, at 274–75 (expounding Lord Mansfield’s opinion in Rex v. Cowle as a rubric to treat “the Americans
as rebellious vassals, to subdue them, and take possession of their country,” which would have
effectively transformed the fabric of law at the foundation of American society from the freely held
common law to the feudal law, which is slavery and conquest).
202. See George P. Smith, II, Marbury v. Madison, Lord Coke and Dr. Bonham: Relics of the Past,
Guidelines for the Present—Judicial Review in Transition?, 2 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 255, 257–58 (1979)
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Lord Coke’s disbanding of English Star Chambers through the courts led
directly to the English Civil War between the Republicans and Royalists.203
The fracturing of English society during this dispute gave rise to the absolute
dictator Oliver Cromwell.204 While Lord Camden dutifully cited to the first
habeas corpus law in Entick,205 he otherwise ignored Cromwell’s illegitimate
positive laws for general warrants in England.206
Out of the wars waged by funds stolen from the English through general
warrants,207 Oliver Cromwell pillaged Ireland and conquered the Spanish
territory of Jamaica.208 Lord Mansfield specifically cited to Cromwell’s
conquest as the basis of all British Empire on a right to conquest in Rex v.
Cowle.209 In Novanglus, John Adams cited Rex v. Cowle as an example of the
English goal of annexing America to England through feudal conquest here:
We must now turn to Burrows’s reports, vol. 2. 834. Rex vs. Cowle. . . . This
opinion of the court was delivered by lord Mansfield in the year 1759. In
conformity to the system contained in these words, my lord Mansfield, and my
lord North, together with their little friends Bernard and Hutchinson, have
(discussing Coke’s decision, which contained precursors to the American legal principles of judicial
review and double jeopardy); SIMMONS, supra note 196, at 2 (discussing how the colonists resolved
“to confer on the judiciary the power to declare unconstitutional statutes void”—the rule from
Dr. Bonham’s Case); JAMES OTIS, Rights of the British Colonies, in COLLECTED POLITICAL WRITINGS OF
JAMES OTIS 175–76 n.* (Richard Samuelson ed., 2015) (citing Dr. Bonham’s Case [1610] 8 Co. Rep.
107a, 118a (Eng.)).
203. 3 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES *181–83 (noting that the Case and Statute of Monopolies
required the common law to take precedence over Star Chamber practice); 1 JOHN LORD CAMPBELL,
THE LIVES OF THE CHIEF JUSTICES OF ENGLAND 383 (1849) (stating Coke’s resolutions were
eventually “made the foundation of the Habeas Corpus Act”); see Habeas Corpus Act 1640, 16 Car. I c.
10 (Eng.) (legally abolishing the Star Chamber).
204. Instrument of Government (1653), in 2 ACTS, supra note 198, at 813–822 (installing Oliver
Cromwell as Lord Protector with supreme legislative and executive powers); Humble Petition and Advice
(1657), in 2 ACTS, supra note 198, at 1049–57 (granting Oliver Cromwell absolute power for life, like a
king); THOMAS HOBBES, BEHEMOTH 130–40 (Ferdinand Tönnies ed., 1990).
205. Entick, 19 How. St. Tr. at 1049–51 (citing Habeas Corpus Act 1640, 16 Car. I c. 10 (Eng.)).
206. Id.; see, e.g., Oliver Cromwell, Underneath—Writ of Assistance (May 9, 1648), in 3 CARLYLE,
supra note 199, at 385. Around the time Entick was decided, only the Americans leveled an attack on
Cromwellian laws in England. SIMMONS, supra note 196, at 20.
207. See, e.g., An Ordinance For Raising of Twenty Thousand Pounds a Moneth for the Relief
of Ireland, in 1 ACTS, supra note 198, at 1072, 1099–1100 (showing how Cromwell used general
warrants to steal taxes from England to fund his pillages of Ireland).
208. Campbell v. Hall [1774] 20 How. St. Tr. 239, 289 (Eng.) (“Jamaica was conquered by
Oliver Cromwell.”).
209. Rex v. Cowle [1759] 2 Burr. Rep. 834, 835 (Eng.); cf. Campbell, 20 How. St. Tr. at 289,
98 Eng. Rep. at 1048–49 (citing the conquest of Jamaica as well as the conquest of Berwick, which was
adjudicated in Rex v. Cowle, as bases of the ruling).

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol53/iss4/2

36

Schroeder: The Dark Side of Due Process: Part III
SCHROEDER III_STEP 5 (DO NOT DELETE)

2022]

THE DARK SIDE OF DUE PROCESS: PART III

12/10/2022 11:33 AM

965

“conceived the great design of annexing” all North America “to the realm of
England,” and “the better to effectuate this idea, they all maintain, that NorthAmerica is holden of the crown.”
And, no matter upon what foundation, they all maintained that America is
dependent on the imperial crown and parliament of Great Britain: and they
are all very eagerly desirous of treating the Americans as rebellious vassals, to
subdue them and take possession of their country. And when they do, no
doubt America will come back as parcel of the realm of England, from which,
by fiction of law at least, or by virtual representation, or by some other dream
of a shadow of a shade, they had been originally severed.210

The English people later invalidated Cromwell’s laws and orders as to
themselves, which Lord Mansfield begrudgingly commemorated in
Somerset’s Case.211 But Mansfield cited Cromwell’s conquest of Jamaica in
Rex v. Cowle and Campbell v. Hall as the legal basis of limiting the freedom of
England to its national borders, excluding the Americans from the common
law protections of English free soil, and ultimately affirming the Navigation
Acts, which were “a plagiarism from Oliver Cromwell.”212 In Cowle and
Campbell, Mansfield instantiated the Hobbesian state of nature of absolute
war as a general and overriding English feudal law of which its common law
antecedent, embodied by Somerset, was only an exception.213
210. Letter from Novanglus to the Inhabitants of the Colony of Massachusetts Bay
(Apr. 10, 1775), reprinted in JOHN ADAMS & JONATHAN SEWALL, NOVANGLUS AND
MASSACHUSETTENSIS 129–30 (1819).
211. Somerset v. Stewart (1772) 98 Eng. Rep. 499, 500, 510 (Eng.) (noting that by common law
English soil is free soil: “the laws of this country, extend itself to those who have been brought over
to a soil whose air is deemed too pure for slaves to breathe in it . . . therefore the black must be
discharged”); George van Cleve, “Somerset’s Case” and Its Antecedents in Imperial Perspective, 24 L. & HIST.
REV. 601, 603–04 (2006) (noting how Somerset’s Case was based in the English perspective “during the
period 1540 to 1771” that based its conception of English freedom on the distinction of English soil
being free and potentially the rest of the world being enslaved or at least less free that England).
212. SIMMONS, supra note 196, at 12, 20 (noting that the English Navigation Acts were “a
plagiarism from Oliver Cromwell”); An Act for increase of Shipping, and Encouragement of the Navigation of
this Nation, [Oct. 9, 1651], in 2 ACTS, supra note 198, at 559–62; The Navigation Act 1660, 12 Car. 2 c.
18 (Eng.); cf. Jones Act, 41 Stat. 988 (demonstrating that the United Stated failed to do much better
than England when it eventually enacted this law loosely based on the English Navigation Acts).
213. Cowle, 2 Burr. Rep. at 835 (explaining that habeas corpus, a common law writ, did not
extend to Berwick because it was conquered outside of the national borders of England and thus
subject to feudal law); Campbell, 98 Eng. Rep. at 1047 (“An Englishman in Ireland, Minorca, the Isle of
Man, or the plantations [in America], has no privilege distinct from the natives.”); id. at 1048 (noting
that the world outside of England remains in chaos with no property until the king “receives the
inhabitants under his protection and grants them their property” of which “he has a power to fix such
terms and conditions as he thinks proper”); RUSSELL, A HISTORY, supra note 1, at 550 (noting that in
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Establishing this apparent contradiction of common and feudal laws was
not actually very complicated from the English perspective around 1776.214
Mansfield’s outlook was rather ordinary, perhaps best embodied in his time
by the English anthem Rule Britannia, which says that by conquering the
world “Britons never, never, never, shall be slaves!”215 Noticing that Rule
Britannia exemplified the idea that the freedom of English people was
intended to be reserved only to them by conquering everyone else, John
Adams once wrote to James Lovell in 1779 that this song “Speaks the Soul
of every Englishman. Britannia sings to her Sons.”216
Back in 1765, when the Americans were still asking Great Britain to
extend the common law rights of the Englishman to America, Lord Camden
was perhaps unable to find the place in English history where general
warrants originated.217 James Otis similarly could find no legitimate legal
origin of writs of assistance in the English law.218 According to Adams,
the laws of the interregnum were all censored at the time Lord Mansfield
affirmed them in Cowle and Campbell as the basis of British Empire.219
Lord Mansfield preferred to locate the origin of the British Empire in the
pretended right of Cromwell, a regicide, to conquer Jamaica.220 Mansfield
ignored the British Empire’s actual origins in Massachusetts and Virginia

Hobbes’s “state of nature, there is no property, no justice or injustice; there is only war, and ‘force and
fraud are, in war, the two cardinal virtues’”); cf. ADAMS, THE REVOLUTIONARY, supra note 26, at 274–
75 (using Cowle to explain how English feudalism structurally excluded America in order to justify the
brutality of conquest and re-conquest).
214. 2 WILSON, supra note 150, at 1050–51 (noting that by choosing to limit the rights of
Englishman geographically to England that “Britain seems determined to merit and to perpetuate, in
political as well as geographical accuracy, the description, by which it was marked many centuries ago—
‘divisos toto orbe Britannos’” paraphrasing a well-known quote by Virgil that may be translated as: “The
Britons separated from the whole world.”).
215. RupertJones, Rule Britannia – Last Night of the Proms 2009, YOUTUBE (Sept. 13, 2009),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rB5Nbp_gmgQ.
216. Letter from John Adams to James Lovell (Oct. 4, 1779).
217. See Entick v. Carrington [1765] 19 How. St. Tr. 1029, 1069–70 (Eng.) (attempting to find
the history of general warrants).
218. SIMMONS, supra note 196, at 16 n.* (“The form of this writ, was no where to be found; in
no statute, no law book, no volume of entries; neither in Rastall, Coke, or Fitzherbert, nor even in the
Instructor Clericalis, or Burns Justice. Where then was it to be found? No where, but in the imagination
or invention, of Boston Custom House Officers, Royal Governors, West India Planters, or Naval
Commanders.” (source citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
219. Id. at 16–27 (“[T]hese writs had been issued, though by what authority is not stated.”).
220. Rex v. Cowle [1759] 2 Burr. Rep. 834, 835 (Eng.); Campbell v. Hall [1774] 20 How. St. Tr.
239, 289 (Eng.).
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under the natural rights of the immigrant.221 In Entick, Lord Camden failed
to assist the Americans by properly overruling the Puritanical laws of the
interregnum as illegitimate laws, including Cromwell’s Navigation Acts,
according to Dr. Bonham’s Case.222
The common law facilitated the English Court’s invention of almost the
entire gamut of tort, contract, property law, and other private forms of
suit.223 The first of these developments apparently occurred in the case of
Rattlesdene v. Grunestone, where medieval English judges invented implied
warranties for wholesome food and drink.224 Despite “the shock of the
Norman Conquest,” English judges were able to trick the system in favor
of human rights over the brutalities of a conquering crown.225
The King only gave an action for trespass vi et armis, meaning “with
arms.”226 But in Rattlesdene, a case about wine debauched with sea water,
the judges strategically pretended that arrows and swords were forcefully
used to introduce the unwholesome, dirty sea water into the wine.227 This
was likely the birth of the implied warranty of merchantable goods, and the
start of the English judiciary’s common law resistance to the conquering
crown of Normandy.228
The English common law, as applied for centuries prior to Entick, guided
the construction of positive laws to invent new forms of action to be heard
in court.229 The Parliament over the centuries took heed and responded by
affirming these preexisting rights, most famously in The Statute of

221. ADAMS, THE REVOLUTIONARY, supra note 26, at 238 (“[O]ur ancestors were entitled to
the common law of England when they emigrated.”); See OTIS, supra note 202, at 162 (citing Jeremiah
Dummer, A Defence of the New-England Charters [1721]).
222. Compare Entick, 19 How. St. Tr. at 1069–70, with SIMMONS, supra note 196, at 20.
223. J. H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 60–64, 196–202 (4th ed.,
2002)
224. Rattlesdene v. Grunestone [1317] YB 10 Edw II (54 SS) 140 (Eng.), in J.H. BAKER & S.F.C.
MILSOM, SOURCES OF ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY: PRIVATE LAW TO 1750, at 341 (2013).
225. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *17; see BAKER, supra note 223, at 60–64. See,
e.g., BAKER & MILSOM, supra note 224, at 341.
226. BAKER & MILSOM, supra note 224, at 213.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *17 (describing how the common law was
adaptable to changing times); see BAKER, supra note 223, at 60–64. See, e.g., BAKER & MILSOM, supra
note 224, at 341.
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Monopolies.230 However, the laws of England seemed to develop from
exactly the opposite starting point as they developed in America.231
For example, while extolling Entick as a precursor of the Fourth
Amendment, the Boyd Court departed from Entick in one key and arguably
overriding respect: it overruled a duly enacted law as unconstitutional and
void in the style of Dr. Bonham’s Case.232 The English view, at the time of
Entick rejected the American interpretation of Dr. Bonham’s Case.233 In
1776, English leadership, including Lord Camden, rejected James Otis’
invitation to reignite Coke’s movement for a free England along the same
lines as American independence.234
Neither Brandeis,235 nor Camden,236 nor especially Holmes,237
appeared to endorse Coke’s destruction of unjust laws wherever they

230. 3 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES *182–83 (citing Statute of Monopolies 1623, 21 Jac. 1, c.
3 (Eng.)).
231. Where the primacy of English common law seems to have begun with patents, see 3
EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES *182–83 (citing Statute of Monopolies 1623, 21 Jac. 1, c. 3 (Eng.)), in
America it appears to have begun with copyrights. See JOURNALS OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES OF MASSACHUSETTS 1772–1773, at 135, 137–43 (Mass. Hist. Soc’y ed., 1980)
(indicating Governor Hutchinson vetoed William Billings’ original copyright bill); Thomas Hutchinson,
C.J., et al., To the Public, [Oct. 1772,] in WHEATLEY, supra note 171, at 7 (beginning the American
tradition of author owned copyrights), extended in U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
232. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 638 (1886) (holding the warrants “unconstitutional
and void” and overruling a law as unconstitutional to do so); but see id. at 629 (quoting Entick v.
Carrington [1765] 19 How. St. Tr. 1029, 1069–70 (Eng.)and stating the warrants were “illegal and void,”
which is similar but different from the terms unconstitutional and void used by Lord Coke in Dr.
Bonham’s Case and repeated by the Americans in Boyd, i.e., Lord Camden did not overrule a law to find
the warrants void).
233. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *91, quoted in John V. Orth, Did Sir Edward
Coke Mean What He Said, 16 CONST. COMM. 33, 35 (1999); cf. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 524 (1927)
(citing Dr. Bonham’s Case [1610] 8 Co. Rep. 107a, 118a (Eng.)).
234. JOSIAH QUINCY, REPORTS OF CASES ARGUED AND ADJUDGED IN THE SUPERIOR
COURT OF JUDICATURE OF THE PROVINCE OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY 516–17 (1865) (noting Lord
Camden’s disagreement with the holdings of Dr. Bonham’s Case in a speech to the House of Lords in
1768, stating that though Parliament had no right to tax the Americans that no judge could hold the
act unconstitutional or void).
235. See Olmstead v. United State, 277 U.S. 438, 472–73 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (citing
Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927), and deciding that the parties had constitutional rights to privacy when
there was a state law to support it, resembling Entick rather than Boyd).
236. See QUINCY, supra note 234, at 517 (suggesting Camden probably believed that individuals
did have rights, but that they usually could not be adjudicated in a meaningful way).
237. See Buck, 274 U.S. at 207 (ignoring the rights of Carrie Buck entirely as irrelevant); Olmstead,
277 U.S. at 469 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“I am not prepared to say that the penumbra of the Fourth
and Fifth Amendments covers the defendant. . . .”).
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violated human rights.238 The practice of overruling unjust laws as
unconstitutional was fully endorsed by the English Lords Coke and Holt,239
James Otis in Paxton’s Case,240 and the United States Supreme Court in
Marbury and Boyd.241 In Entick, the English court rejected Dr. Bonham’s Case
just as the Americans adopted it.242
Nor did Brandeis, Camden, or Holmes comprehend Phillis Wheatley’s
role in importing common law rights into America in the wake of England’s
rejection of Lord Coke.243 As discussed in The Dark Side of Due Process: Part
I, Justice Brandeis demonstrated ignorance of the copyrights Phillis
Wheatley secured for herself and defined the right of privacy as an extension
of Star Chamber copyright law cited in Millar v. Taylor instead.244 Lord
Camden overruled the Star Chamber precedent Brandeis relied upon in the
House of Lords without mentioning the famous Phillis Wheatley who
contemporaneously vindicated the very rights he discussed in Donaldson v.
Beckett.245 Meanwhile, Justice Holmes seemed to flat out reject the existence
of Wheatley’s common law rights wholesale by disparaging them as mere
penumbra.246
Rather, as also discussed in The Dark Side of Due Process: Part I, in the
progressive era of Justice Holmes people with Phillis Wheatley’s skin color

238. See Buck, 274 U.S. at 207 (ignoring the rights of Carrie Buck entirely as irrelevant); QUINCY,
supra note 234, at 517 (suggesting “things may be legal and yet unconstitutional”).
239. Dr. Bonham’s Case [1610] 8 Co. Rep. 107a, 118a (Eng.); Day v. Savadge [1614] Hob. 85,
87 (Eng.); cf. OTIS, supra note 202, at 175–76 n.*.
240. SIMMONS, supra note 196, at 2.
241. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177–80 (1803); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 638
(1886) (“the notice to produce the invoice in this case, the order by virtue of which it was issued, and
the law which authorized the order were unconstitutional and void”) (emphasis added).
242. Compare Entick v. Carrington [1765] 19 How. St. Tr. 1029, 1069–70 (Eng.), and 1 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *91, with SIMMONS, supra note 196, at 2 , and OTIS, supra note 202,
at 175–76 n.*.
243. Schroeder, Leviathan, supra note 23, at 168 (“The recent rediscovery of the revolutionary
figure of Phillis Wheatley, though inspiring, is terribly incomplete; none of us yet captured the legal
significance of Wheatley’s marvelous feat.”).
244. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890)
(quoting Millar v. Taylor [1769] 4 Burr. 2303, 2312 (Eng.)).
245. Proceedings in the Lords on the Question of Literary Property [in Donaldson v. Becket],
Feb. 4–22, 1774, in 17 THE PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY OF ENGLAND, FROM THE EARLIEST PERIOD
TO THE YEAR 1803, at 992 (1813) (labeling Judge Willes’s Star Chamber precedents a product “of the
grossest tyranny and usurpation” and stating that the Star Chamber is one of “the very last places in
which I should have dreamt of finding the least trace of the common law”).
246. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 469 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (disparaging
Justice Brandeis’s defense of individual rights by calling it a “penumbra”).
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and gender were placed on the chopping block of eugenics.247 The
progressive era court also made horcruxes inspired by The Slaughterhouse Cases
for the idea established in Dred Scott that not only black people, but perhaps
all people, were not counted among the people born with the equal,
inalienable rights recognized by the Declaration of Independence.248
Eugenics appeared to come into fashion after the instantiation of Dred Scottlike rationales for the exclusion of women from the voting booth and the
practice of law as well.249
Michelle Alexander’s witness of The New Jim Crow proves that we still
struggle to affirm the preexisting rights that Phillis Wheatley represents.250
A part of this struggle remains what we make of those men who first
established the United States, as their pursuit of social justice through the
inalienable rights of humankind seemed to run aground in a bloody Civil
War only to founder again in a eugenic wasteland that both appeared to be
prophesied in Hobbes’s thoughts about the “Kingdom of Darknesse.”251
247. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927) (constitutionalizing eugenics with a cost/benefit
balancing test); cf. Hon. Sonia Sotomayor, A Latina Judge’s Voice, 13 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 87, 92
(2002) (“Let us not forget that wise men like Oliver Wendell Holmes and Justice Cardozo voted on
cases which upheld both sex and race discrimination in our society.”).
248. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 407 (1856) (“the language used in the Declaration of
Independence, show[s] that neither the class of persons who had been imported as slaves, nor their
descendants, whether they had become free or not, were then acknowledged as part of the people, nor
intended to be included in the general words used in that memorable instrument”); The Slaughterhouse
Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 73 (1872) (referring to “the celebrated Dred Scott case” favorably and, while
acknowledging that the Fourteenth Amendment “overturns the Dred Scott decision,” the Slaughterhouse
Court reaffirmed Chief Justice Taney’s false presupposition in Dred Scott that only rich white men were
intended to be included in the original compact of 1776, in order to demolish the rights of poor white
men and arguably all men); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 275–76 (1901) (similarly resurrecting a
rationale from Dred Scott); cf. Sarah E. Light, Regulatory Horcruxes, 67 DUKE L.J. 1647, 1656–57 n.29
(2018) (explaining what horcruxes are).
249. Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162, 165–66 (1874); Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 140–41
(1872).
250. MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW 228–29 (2010); Zelaya, supra note 15, at 4.
These rights were vindicated and defended by Lord Coke and John Milton before her, but they were
eventually
denied
in
England.
See 3 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES *182–83; JOHN MILTON, EIKONOKLASTES 13 (2d ed. 1650).
251. HOBBES, supra note 2, at 447–48 (noting both foreign and civil war are part of humanity’s
“diversity of ways in running to the same mark, Felicity”); THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE
para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (noting that among humanity’s “certain unalienable rights” is “the pursuit of
Happiness”); HARRY H. LAUGHLIN, EUGENICAL STERILIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES 330 (1922)
(arguing that those who are sterilized are “in now way impaired for his pursuit of . . . happiness” and
that their sterilization will “prevent[] crime and tend[] to future comfort and happiness of the
defective”); see Donald Rutherford, In Pursuit of Happiness: Hobbes’s New Science of Ethics, 31 PHIL. TOPICS
369, 372 (2003) (“Happiness is something that all human beings seek. In this, Hobbes admits, the
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Against the temptation of responding to these failures with Hobbesian
cynicism, Phillis Wheatley raised her voice to contemplate the uses of
unattainable virtues to inspire humanity to make the best of their situation:
O though bright jewel in my aim I strive
To comprehend thee. Thine own words declare
Wisdom is higher than a fool can reach.
I cease to wonder, and no more attempt
Thine height t’explore, or fathom thy profound.
But, O my soul, sink not into despair,
Virtue is near thee, and with gentle hand
Would now embrace thee, hovers o’er thine head
Fain would the heaven-born soul with her converse,
Then seek, then court her for her promised bliss.252
Wheatley doubted the capacity of human beings to understand exactly what
virtue is and wondered “Greatness, or Goodness, say what I shall call thee.”253
She denied knowing the answer exactly, but asked virtue, the “[a]uspicious
queen,” to “[t]each me a better strain, a nobler lay.”254 Wheatley’s doubtful
hope in virtue directly counteracted Hobbes’s certain despair embodied by
his well-known replacement theory for virtues based on the pursuit of
felicity, which is continual happiness.255 Wheatley who developed light and
dark as symbols for the dual nature of how human beings think, was assisted
by her contemporary Goethe who also turned away from Hobbes when he

ancients were correct.”); cf. William R. Lund, Hobbes on Opinion, Private Judgment and Civil War, 13 HIST.
POL. THOUGHT 51, 62 (1992) (noting how Hobbes reasoned that by expressing opinions publicly, as
we do in the United States, civil war must follow as occurred in England during the Puritan Revolution);
Good, supra note 1, at 451–53 (noting how American Hegelians appeared to think that Hegel
prophesied the American Civil War); O’Connor, They Often, supra note 45, at 389 (noting that
progressives, like Justice Holmes, firmly disagreed with the founding ideals); Nourse, Buck, supra note
179, at 109–12 (noting that Holmes’s disparagement of the type of individual rights defended by the
founders facilitated the rebirth of eugenics in Buck v. Bell).
252. Phillis Wheatley, On Virtue [1773].
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id.; HOBBES, supra note 2, at 62 (rejecting virtue theory: “Felicity of this life, consisteth not
in the repose of a mind satisfied. For there is no such Finis ultimus, (utmost ayme,) nor Summum Bonum,
(greatest Good,) . . . .”).
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strained to see the complete picture of humanity and wrote, “Where there
is much light the shadows are deepest.”256
So it is actually not very surprising that when we welcomed John Adams,
an early advocate of spreading a bright light into government affairs, that
James Otis’s sister Mercy Otis Warren noticed Adams’ deep shadow
following closely behind him.257 As president, for example, Adams signed
the Alien & Sedition Acts into law in direct contradiction to his
revolutionary defenses of free speech,258 and he was also one of the
founders who was opposed to establishing the equal rights of women.259
The next and final section below will, therefore, use concepts Phillis
Wheatley developed to make the most of Adams’ contribution to the
founding of the United States without losing sight of Adams’
imperfections.260
C. HOW JOHN ADAMS’ IMAGINATION ILLUMINATED AMERICAN
COMMON LAW RIGHTS
In 2020 and 2021, the United States Supreme Court barely vindicated the
common law over feudal and canon law in a handful of key cases.261 These
256. Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Götz von Berlichingen Act I, Scene 3 [1773] (“Wo viel Licht
ist, ist starker Schatten.”); see, e.g., Phillis Wheatley, Thoughts on the Works of Providence [1773] (noting the
uses of the darkness: “As reason’s pow’rs by day our God disclose, / So we may trace him in the night’s
repose: / Say what is sleep? And dreams how passing strange! / When action ceases, and ideas range”).
257. Letter from Mercy Otis Warren to John Adams (Oct. 11, 1773) (including an original poem
regarding the imagination and self-love, noting that vice boasts the same origin as virtue and stating
quite memorably: “Self, the sole point in which [Caesar and Brutus] both agreed / By this Romes
shackled, or by this shes Free’d, / Self Love, that stimulus to Noblest aim, Bids Nero Light the Capital
in Flame”); 3 MERCY OTIS WARREN, A HISTORY OF THE RISE, PROGRESS, AND TERMINATION OF
THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 392–94 (1805) (“After Mr. Adams’s return from England, he was
implicated by a large portion of his countrymen, as having relinquished the republican system, and
forgotten the principles of the American revolution, which he had advocated for near twenty years.”).
258. ADAMS, THE REVOLUTIONARY, supra note 26, at 28 (describing every common person’s
right to know “of the characters and conduct of their rulers”); Alien Enemies Act of 1798, 50 U.S.C.
§§ 21–24 (the only part of the Alien & Sedition Act that is still on the books).
259. Letter from John Adams to Abigail Adams (Apr. 14, 1776) (expressing his fears that
establishing the rights of women “would subject Us to the Despotism of the Peticoat”).
260. See, e.g., Schroeder, Leviathan, supra note 23, at 159–60 (noting how Wheatley gently
corrected the errors of her male contemporaries).
261. See, e.g., Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1395–96 (2020) (noting that the jury trial
mentioned in the Sixth Amendment is “a vital right protected by the common law”); Niz-Chavez v.
Garland, 141 S. Ct. 1474, 1480 (2021) (refusing to “defer to some conflicting reading [of a statute] the
government might advance” when the ordinary meaning may be evinced from the text and structure
of the statute itself according to the court’s tools of common law construction); McGirt v. Oklahoma,
140 S. Ct. 2452, 2477 (2020) (upholding the American idea of Native American sovereignty by
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cases stood out from the usual “breezy cost-benefit analys[es],”262 “raw
consequentialist calculation[s],”263 “nebulous balancing test[s],”264 and
other cost/benefit balancing approaches.265 These inventions of legal
realism in America are summed up by the proliferation of Mathews’ due
process framework throughout the country.266
Showing Mathews’ cost/benefit balancing tests to be adverse to the
common law conception of due process is only part of the picture.267
extending Worcester v. Georgia, a holding that respected the original common law origins of sovereignty
in the United States from a purchase rather than conquest or discovery); June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v.
Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2134 (2020) (Roberts, C.J., concurring in the judgment) (adding the decisive
vote to the plurality opinion in order to preserve the common law doctrine of stare decisis).
262. Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1401; cf. Edward v. Vannoy, 141 S. Ct. 1547, 1555–57 (2021) (quoting
Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 242 (1990)) (refusing to apply Ramos retroactively because “the ‘costs
imposed upon the States by retroactive application of new rules of constitutional law on habeas corpus
thus generally far outweigh the benefits of this application’”—absurdly treating the ancient common
law requirement of a jury trial as “new” in order to pretend that it was legitimate for Oregon and
Louisiana to violate it prior to Ramos; pretending as if the 48 other states all acted spontaneously to
secure that ancient right all this time).
263. Niz-Chavez, 141 S. Ct. at 1486; cf. Matter of LaParra, 28 I&N Dec. 425, 436 (BIA 2022)
(pretending that Lopez v. Barr was never decided contrary to this rationale in the Ninth Circuit, and
acknowledging a contrary Fifth Circuit opinion extending Niz-Chavez, but ignoring it as merely
persuasive based on a very strange idea that (1) it did not apply the ordinary meaning of the statute
when it did, and (2) that a federal agency need not listen to every Circuit Court, much less the U.S.
Supreme Court, but only the ones with the theoretical power to directly overrule its decisions).
264. McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2501 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); cf. State ex rel. Matloff v. Wallace, 497
P.3d 686, 693–94 (Okla. Crim. App. 2021) (refusing to apply McGirt retroactively because of the
“disruptive and costly consequences”), cert. denied sub nom., Parish v. Oklahoma, 142 S. Ct. 757 (2022).
265. See June Medical Servs., 140 S. Ct. at 2120–33 (plurality opinion) (applying a cost/benefit
balancing test); id. at 2182 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (“Today, five Members of the Court reject the
Whole Woman’s Health cost-benefit standard.”). In a leaked draft opinion purporting to overrule Roe v.
Wade and Casey v. Planned Parenthood, Justice Alito used the Court's rejection of the plurality opinion's
balancing test in June Medical to justify the disparagement of almost every judicial recognition of
preexisting rights from Loving v. Virginia to Obergefell v. Hodges without adequately acknowledging that
Chief Justice Roberts's rejection of balancing tests was intended as an affirmation of the right to
abortion under Roe v. Wade. Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Org., No. 19-1392 unofficial leaked
1st draft opinion 31–32, 56 (2022).
266. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 349 (1976) (balancing the interests of the individual
and the government actor); see Gillian E. Metzger, The Constitutional Duty to Supervise, 124 YALE L. J.
1836, 1865 (2015) (noting that “[i]n the due process realm, the reigning [analysis is] Mathews v. Eldridge”);
Aleinikoff, supra note 121, at 948 (explaining the ad hoc nature of Mathews balancing, and noting how
“ad hoc balancing may undermine the development of stable, knowable principles of law”).
267. PHILIP SCHOFIELD, UTILITY & DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JEREMY
BENTHAM 241 (2006) (describing Bentham’s dual projects of legal positivism and utilitarianism as the
same project); cf. AUSTIN WOOLRYCH, COMMONWEALTH TO PROTECTORATE 271–73, 300 (1982)
(noting that legal positivism began with the Massachusetts Bay Puritans); Rutherford, supra note 251,
at 383 (explaining Hobbes’s concept felicity as a rejection of virtue theory that animated his overall
theory of government that may have inspired Bentham’s adoption of utilitarian cost/benefit balancing).
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Despite a few slight rejections of due process balancing tests around 2020,
Mathews’ hold is growing ever stronger in the United States.268 Perhaps the
more pertinent half to the whole is to show how Mathews’ balancing
approaches to due process open the door back to the feudal and canon laws
of England.269
During the American Revolution, feudal and canon laws were
thoughtfully rejected by the founders.270 The overall sentiment of the
founders regarding this topic was presented fully in John Adams’ Dissertation
on the Feudal and Canon Laws, where he observed “a wicked confederacy
between the two systems of tyranny.”271 Thus, Adams named the
contemptible collusion between priests and princes against the common
people of England:
[T]hat the temporal grandees should contribute every thing in their power to
maintain the ascendancy of the priesthood, and that the spiritual grandees in
their turn, should employ their ascendency over the consciences of the people,
in impressing on their minds a blind, implicit obedience to civil magistracy.272

Adams recounted the historical fact that the oppressions wrought by feudal
and canon laws in Europe “accomplished the settlement of America.”273
He remembered that the Americans originally set out to establish a “refuge
from the temporal and spiritual principalities and powers . . . in direct
If common law is defined as right reason, then Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky’s research requires
common law to reject Benthamite cost/benefit balancing tests as irrational. KAHNEMAN, supra
note 48, at 377–78, 381; 2 WILSON, supra note 150, at 750 (explaining that the common law is “the
golden and sacred rule of reason”).
268. Compare June Medical Servs., 140 S. Ct. at 2134 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in the judgment)
(defending common law stare decisis), with id. at 2120–33 (plurality opinion) (weighing the costs and
benefits of continuing to extend abortion rights to women under Roe v. Wade).
269. See, e.g., Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982) (noting, in the context of a Mathews
balancing test, that historically “the power to admit or exclude aliens is a sovereign prerogative”), quoted
by DHS v. Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. 1959, 1982 (2020) (applying a prerogative power, derived from
English feudalism, to deport asylum seekers without a hearing and dispensing with the balancing test
shell that Landon was supposed to represent). Thuraissigiam applied such a broad prerogative by
appearing to disclaim the judicial power to review executive interpretations of the law, and it seems
that it transcended Lord Coke’s previous limitations, which limited English prerogatives to that which
the common law, i.e., the law of the land, allows. The Case of Proclamations, 12 Co. Rep. at 76 (“the
King hath no Prerogative, but that which the Law of the Land allows him”).
270. See, e.g., ADAMS, THE REVOLUTIONARY, supra note 26, at 240 (rejecting the canon and
feudal laws in favor of the common law rights of immigrants and Native Americans).
271. Id. at 23.
272. Id.
273. Id.
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opposition to the canon and the feudal systems.”274 Adams presented the
idea that the founders carried the common law with them to the colonies as
presented by Jeremiah Dummer’s Defence of Charters and argued by James
Otis in Paxton’s Case.275
The American Revolutionaries redoubled their longstanding claim that by
their flight “into the wilderness” they availed themselves of their natural
rights originally granted to them by God.276 They furthermore asserted that
through their emigration away from England they carried with them an
inheritance of common law rights.277 Thus, John Adams took his place
alongside numerous others to recount the cause of his ancestors:
The adventurers so often mentioned, had an utter contempt of all that dark
ribaldry of hereditary, indefeasible right,—the Lord’s anointed,—and the
divine, miraculous original of government, with which the priesthood had
enveloped the feudal monarch in clouds and mysteries, and from whence they
had deduced the most mischievous of all doctrines, that of passive obedience
and non-resistance. They knew that government was a plain, simple,
intelligible thing, founded in nature and reason, and quite comprehensible by
common sense. They detested all the base services and servile dependencies
of the feudal system. They knew that no such unworthy dependencies took
place in the ancient seats of liberty, the republics of Greece and Rome; and
they thought all such slavish subordinations were equally inconsistent with the
constitution of human nature and that religious liberty with which Jesus had
made them free. This was certainly the opinion they had formed; and they
were far from being singular or extravagant in thinking so.278

This is not the doctrine of discovery or rights of conquest to justify
European rule over the Americas.279 Rather, the founders of the United
States staked their legitimate rights to govern themselves upon an “actual
Purchase from the Natives.”280 This right, originally defended by Roger
274. Id. at 24.
275. Id. at 23–24, 140–41; OTIS, supra note 202, at 162 (quoting Jeremiah Dummer, A Defence of
the New-England Charters [1721]) (“Thus we see, that the court of admiralty long ago discover’d, no very
friendly disposition towards the common law courts here.”)
276. ARENDT, supra note 129, at 92; see ADAMS, THE REVOLUTIONARY, supra note 26, at 184
(discussing the troubles of English citizens as they fled their native country).
277. See supra note 275; see also WILSON, supra note 150, at 781 (“As citizens, who emigrate, carry
with them their laws, their best birthright; so, as might be expected, they transmit this best birthright
to their posterity.”).
278. ADAMS, THE REVOLUTIONARY, supra note 26, at 26.
279. Id. at 240.
280. Id. at 139.
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Williams and rejected by the Puritan leadership of his day,281 later became
the basis of American law in Worcester v. Georgia, and extended in 2020 in
McGirt v. Oklahoma as a fundamental promise to respect the rights of Native
Americans as the basis of all rights.282
In addition to the colonists effectively carrying over their rights from
England, founder of Rhode Island Roger Williams famously asserted that
the Native Americans retained all their common law rights as a gift from
God, and that the colonists bought into these Native rights through
purchases of land, securing them from English oppressions.283 Matching
his revolutionary compatriots, Adams presented Roger Williams’s
conception as the correct formulation of the colonists’ claim to legitimacy:
Discovery, if that was incontestable, could give no title to the English king, by
common law, or by the law of nature, to the lands, tenements, and
hereditaments of the native Indians here. Our ancestors were sensible of this,
and, therefore, honestly purchased their lands of the natives.284

Perhaps Adams can be forgiven for not entirely presenting the basis of this
claim, because there are some obvious weaknesses to it—especially the
brutal genocide of the Native Pequots of Mystic, Connecticut by the
Puritans.285 The Puritans also mercilessly prosecuted witches, whores,
281. See Roger Williams, A Just and Generous Assertion of Indian Rights [1633] (defending Native
American common law property rights), mentioned in 1 JOHN WINTHROP, WINTHROP’S JOURNAL
“HISTORY OF NEW ENGLAND” 116–17 (James Kendall Hosmer ed., 1908) [hereinafter WINTHROP’S
JOURNAL].
282. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 546 (1832) (noting the patents and charters of the
crown “were considered as blank paper so far as the rights of the natives were concerned”), extended by
McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S. Ct. 2452, 2477 (2020) (“On the far end of the Trail of Tears was a
promise.”).
283. Supra note 281.
284. ADAMS, THE REVOLUTIONARY, supra note 26, at 240. See also Roger Sherman, Remarks on
a Pamphlet Entitled, “A Dissertation on the political Union and Constitution of the Thirteen States of NORTHAMERICA.” 16–17, 40–42 (1784) (quoting Deuteronomy 32:8; Acts 17:26) (“God hath made of one blood,
all nations of the earth, and hath determined the bounds of their habitation.”).
285. JOHN MASON, A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE PEQUOT WAR (1736) 15, 18, 20–21 (Paul
Royster, ed., 2007) (applying the same terroristic logic Milton later expressed in Samson Agonistes at lines
865–68 of that poem to commit genocide on the Pequots in order to steal “their Land for an Inheritance”).
See Letter from Roger Williams to Major [John] Mason, in ROGER WILLIAMS, THE LETTERS OF
ROGER WILLIAMS 342–46 (John Russell Bartlett ed., 1874) [hereinafter WILLIAMS, THE LETTERS]
(accusing John Mason of the heresy of worshiping “the great god self” for perpetrating the Pequot
genocide in order to steal Native American lands by force creating an illegitimate title); Memorial
Detailing Conveyance of Mohegan Land to Major John Mason (May 3, 1715) [hereinafter Memorial]
(remembering the passing of land title from the Mohegan tribe to John Mason); Mohegan Indians v.
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homosexuals, and drunkards with the full effect of canon and feudal
processes including bills of attainder and corruptions of blood.286 Adams,
who was busy rallying the forces of revolution, did not adequately respond
to these weak points.287
Nevertheless, Adams’s revolutionary ally Isaac Backus responded to these
weaknesses directly in his pro-freedom of speech and religion tracts and
orations that helped inspire the First Amendment.288 Backus successfully
vindicated Roger Williams’s old defense of the common law rights of the
colonists, including the ones now embodied by the First Amendment,
arising from purchases of land from the Native Americans during the
American Revolution.289 Thus, the causes of Roger Williams and Anne
Connecticut (1705–1773) (the Mason family’s litigation for title and possession of stolen Pequot lands
was cut off by the American Revolution). cf. Mark D. Walters, Mohegan Indians v. Connecticut (1705–1773)
and the Legal Status of Aboriginal Customary Laws and Government in British North America, 33 OSGOODE
HALL L.J. 785, 804–05 (1995) (showing the Mason family’s litigation for title and possession of stolen
Pequot lands was cut off by the American Revolution); Schroeder, Leviathan, supra note 23,
at 253 nn.1329–30 (noting the struggles Native Americans continued to experience in the United States
with illegitimate transfers of land title through the same theory the Mason family originally raised in
Mohegan Indians v. Connecticut through a straw purchaser they claimed was a legitimate guardian of the
Pequots whom John Mason himself massacred).
286. See David C. Brown, The Forfeitures of Salem, 1692, 50 WM. & MARY Q. 85, 86–89 (1993)
(recognizing that, while the Puritans meant to improve the law, they did not improve very much upon
the feudal and canon law of England). See, e.g., THOMAS HUTCHINSON, THE HISTORY OF THE
COLONY OF MASSACHUSET’S BAY 150 (2d ed., 1765) (describing the first recorded execution of a
woman convicted of witchcraft); 1 WINTHROP’S JOURNAL, supra note 281, at 116 (noting that when
Roger Williams attempted to advocate for the common law rights of Native Americans using the
printing press, that the Puritans, acting much like a royal censor, physically destroyed his tract A Just
and Generous Assertion of Indian Rights and yet failed to stop his pro-Native American ideas from spreading
anyways until the founders of the United States adopted it as a foundation of their rights). In John
Adams’s diary, he stated his hope that by defending the Red Coats responsible for the Boston Massacre
that he may have helped America avoid “as foul of a Stain upon this Country as the Executions of the
Quakers or Witches, anciently.” 2 JOHN ADAMS, THE ADAMS PAPERS 79 (L. H. Butterfield ed., 1961)
[hereinafter ADAMS, THE ADAMS].
287. See, e.g., ADAMS, THE REVOLUTIONARY, supra note 26, at 240 (adopting the generally
accepted view that the original colonists “honestly purchased their lands of the natives,” but relying on
others to supply the historical proof). Cf. Howard Ioan Fielding, John Adams: Puritan, Deist, Humanist,
20 J. RELIGION 33, 40 (1940) (explaining that Adams “rejected the Calvinistic theology” and “retained
much of the Puritan philosophy of life,” which is why, perhaps, he did not criticize its weaknesses as
much he might have).
288. Isaac Backus, An Appeal to the Public for Religious Liberty 25–26 [1773] (quoting WILLIAMS II,
supra note 66, at 192).
289. Id. at 26 (noting the causes of Roger Williams’s unjust banishment from Massachusetts
Bay); Isaac Backus, Truth is Great, and Will Prevail 25–28 [1781] (criticizing the Puritans, in part, for their
unjust treatment of the Natives writing, “[i]nstead of civilizing and converting barbarous infidels, as
they undertook to do, they became themselves infidels and barbarians”).
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Hutchinson, whose husband and several followers co-founded Rhode
Island with Williams based on an actual principle of religious freedom, were
finally vindicated during the American Revolution.290
The Pequot Massacre resulted in a claim by the family of Captain John
Mason, who originally led the military onslaught of the Pequots of Mystic,
of a divine right to own the lands their patriarch stole.291 But the Mason
family soon found themselves tangled up in feudal court, subject to a crown
that reserved the right of conquest to itself.292 Eventually, the Mason
family devised a straw purchaser out of the Mohegan Tribe to legitimize
their ownership of the land they formerly stole in order to object to the
crown’s claims by conquest.293
During the American Revolution even the Masons, as inheritors of the
spoils of America’s genocidal past, were forced to adopt the American idea
of purchases first popularized by Roger Williams.294 The apology of former
Witch Judge Samuel Sewall was also adopted by the American population at
large.295 This contested history, though relevant and supportive of the
290. See, e.g., Thomas Jefferson, 82. A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom [June 18, 1779]
(echoing Backus’s wisdom: “truth is great and will prevail if left to herself”); U.S. CONST. amend. I
(establishing the religious freedom Roger Williams pioneered as a dissenting voice in the Puritan
experiment as a basis of the United States form of government).
291. MASON, supra note 285, at 15, 18, 20–21; Mohegan Indians v. Connecticut (1705–1773).
Cf. Walters, supra note 285, at 803–04 (attempting to legitimize and legalize the Mohegans’ straw
conveyance of the lands of the no longer existing Pequot People to the Mason family whose ancestor
led the army that murdered the Pequots to take their land).
292. Walters, supra note 263, at 792. Cf. Campbell v. Hall [1774] 98 Eng. Rep. 1045, 1048 (Eng.)
(“It is left by the constitution to the King’s authority to grant or refuse a capitulation: if he refuses, and
puts the inhabitants to the sword or exterminates them, all the lands belong to him.”).
293. Walters, supra note 285, at 804–05 (showing Mason named himself and “his heirs ‘as their
Protector and Guardian In Trust for the whole Mohegan Tribe’” in order to cover up the actual reason
Mason had possession over Pequot lands, which he claimed in this case were actually Mohegan lands);
cf. MASON, supra note 285, at 15, 18, 20 (recalling the conquest and subsequent conveyance of Mohegan
lands); WILLIAMS, THE LETTERS, supra note 285, at 342.
294. See 1 WINTHROP’S JOURNAL, supra note 281, at 116 (noting Roger Williams’s advocacy
that the colonists’ title to land in America derived from the Native Title, and depended upon their
God-given common law rights, separate from anything granted or claimed or discovered from Europe);
1 WINTHROP’S JOURNAL, supra note 281, at 264–65 (noting how Roger Williams and Anne Hutchinson
purchased Rhode Island from the Native Americans); Memorial, supra note 285 (detailing the
subsequent attempt to document a purchase between Mason and the Mohegans); Mohegan Indians v.
Connecticut (1705–1773); Walters, supra note 285, at 803–04 (showing how the Masons attempted to
legitimize their possession of Pequot lands as a conveyance from the Mohegan Tribe).
295. See EVE LAPLANTE, SALEM WITCH JUDGE 1–5 (HarperCollins 2009) [hereinafter
LAPLANTE, SALEM] (acknowledging the unjust Salem witch hangings, the repentance of one of the
witch judges named Samuel Sewall, and the honor Samuel Sewall received for his apology in the public
mural titled “Milestones on the Road to Freedom”); cf. 2 ADAMS, THE ADAMS, supra note 286, at 79
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general position of the Americans as a repentant, imperfect people, is
difficult to explain.296
It was enough, in Novanglus, for John Adams to name the feudal law in
Rex v. Cowle that was being used to oppress the American Colonies.297 That
law, if extended to American Colonies, would have revoked all the rights of
the colonists under feudalism, which remains the state of rights versus
powers in England today.298 Inspired by James Otis’ cause for the people,
Adams explicitly disputed the English formulation of rights and powers:
Let it be known, that British liberties are not the grants of princes or
parliaments, but original rights, conditions of original contracts, coequal with
prerogative, and coeval with government; that many of our rights are inherent
and essential, agreed on as maxims, and established as preliminaries, even
before a parliament existed.299

In his controversy with William Brattle, for example, Adams located the
dependency of judges upon the crown in the feudal law and identified it as
one of the primary problems of British government.300 Adams repeated
this conclusion in his 1776 tract Thoughts on Government, which was adopted
into Article III of the United States Constitution.301 This was the first and
only original addition of the American Revolution into the political
science.302

(noting his defense of the Red Coats as an attempt at making amends and a sign that Massachusetts
repented from the witch trials of its past).
296. Eve LaPlante’s stellar works in this area prove that the effort is worth the reward.
See generally LAPLANTE, SALEM, supra note 295 (illustrating social awareness of regrettable past
atrocities); EVE LAPLANTE, AMERICAN JEZEBEL (HarperCollins 2010) [hereinafter LAPLANTE,
AMERICAN] (documenting atrocities on American soil).
297. See ADAMS & SEWALL, supra note 210, at 129–30 and accompanying text.
298. Id.; Rex v. Cowle [1759] 2 Burr. Rep. 834, 835 (Eng.), extended by Campbell v. Hall [1774]
20 How. St. Tr. 239, 289 (Eng.), aff’d, and extended by R. v. Secretary of State for Foreign and
Commonwealth Affairs, Ex parte Bancoult UKHL 61, ¶¶ 32, 36, 81–84, 87, 125, 146–49 (Eng. 2008),
rejected by Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 751 (2008).
299. ADAMS, THE REVOLUTIONARY, supra note 26, at 33.
300. Id. at 75–77.
301. Id. at 116, 291–92 (speaking of independent judges, “their commissions should be during
good behavior, and their salaries ascertained and established by law” and that their offices should be
held “during good behavior”), extended by U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (requiring that federal judges serve
during “good Behaviour”).
302. See ARENDT, supra note 129, at 200 (quoting James Madison’s statement that the
independent judiciary was “the unique contribution of America to the science of government”)
(internal quotations marks omitted).
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Adams hoped that this peculiar contribution would create a system that
shunned feudal and canon law forever, as an obvious form of tyrannical
absurdity.303 However, possibly during his stay in England,304 Adams
developed a devout rationalism and believed the human mind could
automatically perceive what is in our best interests.305 However, Nobel
Prize winning psychologist Daniel Kahneman recently debunked Adams’s
rationalism with the help of his research partner Amos Tversky.306
While Adams’s contribution of independent courts is undoubtedly
necessary, Kahneman & Tversky noted that we cannot presume the
rationality of judges to know what is in their best interests.307 It is
disappointing, but not surprising, that independent United States judges
currently embrace the judicial dependence of canon and feudal law.308 The
unwitting proliferation of judicial forays into the feudal and canon law is
observed in several recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions.309
303. Id.; ADAMS, THE REVOLUTIONARY, supra note 26, at 115.
304. Cf. 3 WARREN, supra note 257, at 392–94 (noting that something changed regarding Adams
after his stay in England).
305. See 1 JOHN ADAMS, A DEFENCE OF THE CONSTITUTIONS OF GOVERNMENT OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 5, 8 (1787) [hereinafter ADAMS, A DEFENCE] (basing his defense of a
separation of powers “in nature and reason” and hoping that if the French were reasonable they would
adopt the plan rather than listening to Turgot’s critiques of American constitutions).
306. KAHNEMAN, supra note 48, at 377–78, 381. Cf. Letter from John Adams to Thomas
Boylston Adams (Apr. 7, 1796) (appearing to offer strong evidence of the irrationality of humankind
in the face of his rationalistic endeavors: “Nedham as great a Changling as he was, and as great a Villain,
has
had
more
honour
done
to
his
weak
system
than
Sir Thomas More, Mr. Harrington or even Plato. It has cost many hundreds of thousands of Lives to
cure France of their Idolatry to it. And I am afraid my good Friends the Dutch will have reason too
to repent of it. Oh Franklin! Thy Rods will not in a thousand Years save half the Number of Lives
that has been destroyed already in France by their inconsiderate Admiration of thy Attachment to
Marchmont Nedhams Legislation.”).
307. See KAHNEMAN, supra note 48, at 377–78, 381.
308. See Torres v. Madrid, 141 S. Ct. 989, 997 (2021) (citing to the Star Chamber as good law);
United States v. Arthrex, Inc., 141 S. Ct. 1970, 1977–82 (2021) (quoting Seila Law v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct.
2183, 2203 (2020) (ignoring the founders’ rejection of direct democracy and the fact that the first
presidential elections were not decided by direct votes of the people: “The resulting constitutional
strategy is straightforward: divide power everywhere except for the Presidency, and render the
President directly accountable to the people through regular elections.”)) (extending the privy council
inspired theory from Oil States Energy Servs. under the unitary executive theory established by Seila Law);
Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1376–77 (2018) (citing
to the Privy Council to legitimize PTAB).
309. See Franchise Tax Bd. v. Hyatt, 139 S. Ct. 1485, 1492 (2019), overruling Nevada v. Hall,
440 U.S. 410, 414–15 (1979) (rejecting both “the structure of the feudal system” and the “fiction that
the King could do no wrong”); Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter and Paul Home v. Pennsylvania,
140 S. Ct. 2367, 2379, 2383–84 (2020) (prior to the Little Sisters becoming intervenor, this case caption
was Trump v. Pennsylvania, and Trump remained the central party to the suit while he seemed to
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Several of these opinions are papered over with cost/benefit balancing
tests.310 Embedded in many of these recent opinions is the feudal and
canon laws’ conspiracy to convince the people that all our rights are granted
by governments rather than, as the American Revolutionaries contended,
that human rights are coeval with governments as their legitimizing basis.311
In yet another passage, John Adams declared the American position:

disappear from vision, which is virtually the strategy of John Mason in Mohegan Indians, i.e., this is a
case where the president defeated Congress with a puritan conception of the freedom of religion as
the freedom of one person to take away the freedom of another); Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v.
Morrissey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. 2049, 2069 (2020) (disclaiming the Court’s jurisdiction to review “disputes
between the school and the teacher” under an exception that amounts to interpreting the First
Amendment as the Puritan liberty to take away the liberty of others), extending Hosanna-Tabor
Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 190 (2012) (creating, for the first time, a
ministerial exception to the First Amendment, which allows religious institutions including churches
and schools to openly violate federal and state laws); Kaley v. United States, 571 U.S. 320, 340–41
(2014) (disclaiming judicial review of grand jury proceedings, as discussed in The Dark Side of Due Process:
Part II, is a disturbing mixture of feudal and canon laws, by saying flatly “the answer is: whatever the
grand jury decides”); DHS v. Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. 1959, 1982 (2020) (asserting a feudal power of
prerogative usually reserved to the crown in the English context); Hernandez v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735,
749–50 (2020) (granting U.S. officials qualified immunity to kill or murder Mexican children playing
on the other side of the border—this law arose originally from the maxim that the king can do no
wrong applied in The Bankers Case, which was a quintessential assertion of feudalism).
310. See Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. at 1982 (citing to dicta from Landon v. Plasencia, a Mathews
balancing test case, for its basis of asserting prerogative powers); Hernandez, 140 S. Ct. at 749–50 (citing
to Ziglar v. Abbasi, which administered a balancing test to decide qualified immunity); Kaley, 571 U.S.
at 340–41 (applying a Mathews balancing test to decide the matter in favor of feudal and canon law).
311. See U.S. CONST. pmbl. (referring to the people of the United States as the sovereign),
extended by Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 455–56 (1793) (“[W]e should never forget, that, in truth
and nature, those, who think and speak, and act, are men,” i.e., excluding corporations including public
corporations that compose the outer shell of government making them merely legal persons); id. at 458
(“The sovereign, when traced to his source, must be found in the man.”); id. at 462–63 (rejecting the
English feudal system by citing to the preamble of the U.S. Constitution); id. at 472 (“From the
differences existing between feudal sovereignties and Governments founded on compacts, it
necessarily follows that their respective prerogatives must differ. Sovereignty is the right to govern; a
nation or State-sovereign is the person or persons in whom that resides. In Europe the sovereignty is
generally ascribed to the Prince; here it rests with the people; there, the sovereign actually administers
the Government; here, never in a single instance; our Governors are the agents of the people, and at
most, stand in the same relation to their sovereign, in which regents in Europe stand to their sovereigns.
Their Princes have personal powers, dignities, and pre-eminences, our rulers have none but official;
nor do they partake in the sovereignty otherwise, or in any other capacity, than as private citizens.”),
extended by Hall, 440 U.S. at 419, overruled on other grounds by Hyatt, 139 S. Ct. at 1489, 1492, 1496, 1498
(referring to Chisholm as a “discredited decision” and that it “was incorrect” but not overruling Chisholm
and not discussing its central issue of popular sovereignty versus feudal sovereignty—the reasons Hyatt
overruled Hall regarded Hyatt’s endorsement of a very strained, highly technical, and arguably absurd
reading of the Eleventh Amendment); cf. Schroeder, We Will, supra note 23, at 42 (explaining why Hyatt
was absurdly decided); Randy E. Barnett, The People or the State?: Chisholm v. Georgia and Popular
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Be it remembered, however, that liberty must at all hazards be supported. We
have a right to it, derived from our Maker. But if we had not, our fathers have
earned and bought it for us, at the expense of their ease, their estates, their
pleasure, and their blood. And liberty cannot be preserved without a general
knowledge among the people, who have a right, from the frame of their
nature, to knowledge, as their great Creator, who does nothing in vain, has
given them understandings, and a desire to know; but besides this, they have
a right, an indisputable, unalienable, indefeasible, divine right to that most
dreaded and envied kind of knowledge, I mean, of the characters and conduct
of their rulers. Rulers are no more than attorneys, agents, and trustees, for
the people; and if the cause, the interest and trust, is insidiously betrayed, or
wantonly trifled away, the people have a right to revoke the authority that they
themselves have deputed, and to constitute abler and better agents, attorneys,
and trustees.312

Embedded in this passage was an endorsement of a progressive tax structure
for the benefit of rights secured through public spending in the interest of
all classes of people.313 The rights endowed from our maker were not, in
the time of Adams, seen in terms of negative or positive rights.314 The
human rights Adams presented as most vital were as a light shining in the

Sovereignty, 93 VA. L. REV. 1729, 1750 (2007) (examining how Scalia and others blithely conflated the
people with their legislatures in several decisions to undermine popular sovereignty in America).
312. ADAMS, THE REVOLUTIONARY, supra note 26, at 28.
313. Id.; see 2 RECORDS OF THE GOVERNOR AND COMPANY OF THE MASSACHUSETTS BAY
IN NEW ENGLAND 203 (Nathaniel B. Shurtleff ed., 1853) (establishing compulsory education in
Massachusetts Bay for all classes of people in 1647: “every towneship in this jurisdiction . . . shall then
forthwith appoint one [teacher] within their towne to teach all such children as shall resort to him to
write & reade, whose wages shall be paid either by ye parents or masters of such children, or by ye
inhabitants in general”) (emphasis added).
314. See ADAMS, THE REVOLUTIONARY, supra note 26, at 28 (expounding the right to have an
education paid for by the government as of the same quality as the right not to have one’s property
and chattels searched and seized without reasonable suspicion at least). The non-existence of the new
positive/negative rights dichotomy from John Adams’s time was emphasized by the leadership of
James Otis and Phillis Wheatley, when they electrified the colony by demonstrating that Otis’s right
not to have one’s papers seized by the government is the same right, or at least joined at the hip in a
necessary and mutually affirming way, with Wheatley’s and William Billings’s rights to create those
papers in the first place and to sell them to make a living. See Schroeder, Leviathan, supra note 23,
at 160–65, 182 (“[W]here Otis’s arguments vindicated the private property in curtilage of the home,
Wheatley’s writings vindicated the underlying value of private property as essential to the human
capacities of thought and creativity,” i.e., it appears that Otis’s rights and Wheatley’s rights were one in
the same, and it furthermore seems that artificially separating them as negative and positive rights
respectively could render both theories to fundamental confusion).
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darkness,315 antithetical to penumbral privacy rights that are a “dream of a
shadow of a shade.”316 But, rather, Adams’s right of the citizenry to know,
even facts that embarrassed the government,317 was situated in the light of
knowledge, not in its shadow, dispersed liberally as the sun disperses its
enlightening rays among all classes of people.318
According to the light spread into America through John Adams’s
imagination, the United States established independent courts where the
judges serve during good behavior.319 This structural change did not come
from English common law, but the ingenuity of Adams himself.320 New
innovations like Adams’s took form in America under the auspices of the
capacity of human imagination, a capacity that was defended most stridently
by the founding poetess Phillis Wheatley.321
The common law, while it is not perfectly good and at times endorsed
legal errors,322 is assisted and perhaps even created by the capacity of the
315. See ADAMS, THE REVOLUTIONARY, supra note 26, at 24 (referring to “enlightened . . .
nations,” i.e., the metaphor of light used in the enlightenment was still in fashion); cf. 2 Corinthians 4:6.
316. ADAMS, THE REVOLUTIONARY, supra note 26, at 275.
317. See id. at 28 (declaring that ordinary human beings have a “divine right to that most dreaded
and envied kind of knowledge, I mean, of the characters and conduct of their rulers”).
318. See id. at 21 (“[W]herever a general knowledge and sensibility have prevailed among the
people, arbitrary government and every kind of oppression have lessened and disappeared in
proportion.”); id. at 27 (defending “knowledge diffused generally through the whole body of the
people,” and advocating the propagation and perpetuation of knowledge); id. at 28 (declaring “liberty
cannot be preserved without a general knowledge among the people, who have a right, from the frame
of their nature, to knowledge,” and thus advocating for “the preservation of the means of knowledge
among the lowest ranks”); id. at 34 (stating “let every sluice of knowledge be opened and set a-flowing,”
and naming the Stamp Act an attempt “to strip us in a great measure of the means of knowledge”); id.
at 61 (resisting English attempts “to delude and terrify men out of all their knowledge”); id. at 292
(advocated a constitution that “introduce[d] knowledge among the people, and inspire[d] them with a
conscious dignity becoming freemen”); id. at 321 (“Wisdom and knowledge, as well as virtue, diffused
generally among the body of the people, being necessary for the preservation of their rights and
liberties, and as these depend on spreading the opportunities and advantages of education in the various
parts of the country, and among the different orders of the people, it shall be the duty of legislators
and magistrates, in all future periods of this commonwealth, to cherish the interests of literature and
the sciences, and all seminaries of them,” including in “public schools and grammar schools in the
towns”).
319. See supra note 301 and accompanying text.
320. ADAMS, THE REVOLUTIONARY, supra note 26, at 116, 291–92; cf. ARENDT, supra note 129,
at 200.
321. Phillis Wheatley, On Imagination [1773].
322. 2 WILSON, supra note 150, at 1132 (noting that “parts of the common law, which did not
suit those who emigrated to America . . . were . . . left behind”). See, e.g., Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410,
414–15 (1979) (noting that the feudal principle of sovereign immunity was developed by common law,
but was originally feudal and therefore, in America, illegitimate), overruled on other grounds by Franchise
Tax Bd. v. Hyatt, 139 S. Ct. 1485, 1492 (2019).
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human imagination.323 For example, the independent judiciary was borne
through Adams’s imagination, but its purpose was to defend and expound
the common law by reducing or eliminating feudal and canon influence over
the bench.324 Thus the imagination helps the common law as its
companion, leader, or queen.325
Phillis Wheatley, who authored these metaphors in relation to reason,
provided useful terminology to describe how Adams succeeded in
America.326 Common law is right reason or a product of judicial reasoning
under centuries of collected wisdom through a slow development under the
ancient doctrine known as stare decisis.327 According to Phillis Wheatley, the
capacity of human reason is properly understood as the servant of love, and
the activity of rationalizing is conducted through our mental processes by

323. See Jill Lepore, The Rule of History, NEW YORKER (Apr. 13, 2015),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/04/20/the-rule-of-history [https://perma.cc/389SBEPF] (explaining how Lord Coke imagined the Magna Carta was a binding constitution in England,
and observing how this imagined constitution was actualized in England); cf. 2 WILSON, supra note 150,
at 750–51 (noting that finding the origins of common law in England “is extremely difficult, if not
altogether impracticable,” however, while guessing a “Grecian extraction,” Wilson also noted that the
origins of the common law “is not of essential importance” because “their obligatory force arises not
from any consideration of that kind, but from their free and voluntary reception in the kingdom”).
324. ADAMS, THE REVOLUTIONARY, supra note 26, at 76–79, 88–89 (refuting Brattle’s claim
that an independent judiciary was already structurally established by English common law when it was
not, while also defending the common law’s apparent requirement that English judges be unbiased and
independent in their judgements).
325. Phillis Wheatley seemed to use these metaphors interchangeably. See Phillis Wheatley, On
Imagination [1773] (naming the imagination the queen or leader of the mental train); Phillis Wheatley,
Thoughts on the Works of Providence [1773] (naming reason the servant of love the “celestial queen” in
which “the Godhead [is] shown”).
326. Phillis Wheatley, On Imagination [1773]; Phillis Wheatley, Thoughts on the Works of Providence
[1773] (explaining how the motions of the mind between action and repose are mirrored by the
existence of the day and the night, the light and the darkness, and suggesting that reason and reasoning
exists in the realm of day, while the imagination takes flight in the realm of night while we are resting);
cf. Mercy Otis Warren, To Mr. Adams [1773], enclosed in Letter from Mercy Otis Warren to John Adams
(Oct. 11, 1773) (providing this wonderful poem that also addresses the imagination, privately enclosed
to John Adams). Warren presented the imagination as double-edged: an “aeiry queen, who Guides the
Helm of hope,” but also “Holds A False Mirrour to the Dazzel’d sight / A Dim perspective, A Delusive
light.” Id.
327. See 2 WILSON, supra note 150, at 749–50 (giving several definitions of the common law
including “the golden and sacred rule of reason” and noting that the common law is reason perfected
by time as in the Ciceronian idioms time will tell or test of time: “Time is the wisest of things. If the
qualities of the parent may, in any instance, be expected in the offspring; the common law, one of the
noblest births of time, may be pronounced the wisest of laws.”); id. at 775 (“During many—very many
revolving centuries, the common law has been the peculiar and the deserved favourite of the people
of England.”).
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the imagination, the “leader of the mental train,” with the help of
recollection, the “fair regent of the night.”328
According to Wheatley, when under the auspices of the human
imagination, recollection, and emotion, reason can be an extremely useful
ally.329 This formulation of human mental activity was, perhaps originally,
expounded by Cicero in his tracts Scipio’s Dream, De Amicitia, De Officiis, and
others.330 Thomas Paine agreed with these formulations in his pamphlet
Common Sense, which was a tribute to Ciceronian thought.331
Paine, like his contemporary John Adams, illustrated how even the most
Ciceronian champion of enlightenment can betray their former ideas for the
darkness.332 Both Adams and Paine, as well as Jefferson in the South,
betrayed Ciceronian skeptic idealism (known as empiricism in a later age)
for the dogmas of absolute reason.333 Phillis Wheatley contended that
328. Phillis Wheatley, On Imagination [1773] ); Phillis Wheatley, On Recollection [1773]; Phillis
Wheatley, Thoughts on the Works of Providence [1773].
329. Supra notes 327–28.
330. Cicero, De Re Publica 6.9.9 (demonstrating the proper way to use one’s imagination in the
sixth book of De Re Publica, which is known as Scipio’s Dream); Cicero, De Amicitia 7.24, 24.89, 25.93
(demonstrating how to use one’s experiences of the arts to help define one’s terms—Cicero frequently
cites to Terence the African playwright to help him define love); Cicero, De Officiis 1.4.11 (explaining
the capacity of humans to take action in order to change the course of human events); cf. Phillis
Wheatley, On Friendship [1773] (speaking of “amicitia” in Ciceronian Latin); Phillis Wheatley, To Mæcenas
[1773] (making a place for herself like Terence of Rome in America); OTIS, supra note 202, at 64
(preparing America for Wheatley’s message by observing Terence’s maxim “Homo sum: humani nihil âne
alinum puto, was attended with a Thunder-Clap of Applause through the whole Roman Theatre. ‘He
who don’t consider himself as related to every one of the human Race, is unworthy [of] the Name
Man’”).
331. THOMAS PAINE, COMMON SENSE 2 (1776) (laying the foundation of his argument upon
“the power of feeling”).
332. See Letter from Thomas Paine to his Fellow Citizens of the United States of America, in
THOMAS PAINE, THE AGE OF REASON 3 (1877) [1794] [hereinafter PAINE, THE AGE] (arguing reason
is “[t]he most formidable weapon against errors of every kind”); id. at 86 (declaring his allegiance to
the rationalism of Newton and Descartes). Paine’s contemporaries in America remained aligned with
his earlier thoughts, which were originally galvanized by Wheatley’s leadership. G.W. SNYDER, THE
AGE OF REASON UNREASONABLE 8 (1798); Anon., The Folly of Reason 8, 20, 23 [1794] (“[T]he pretense
of the absolute perfection of human reason is absurd”—”he who is made the most positive of the
sufficiency of his own reason, will be the most likely to be governed by the blindness of his own
passions”); ELIAS BOUDINOT, THE AGE OF REVELATION 25–26, 30, 66, 162 (1801) (referring to
Thomas Paine’s tract Common Sense with tentative approval, while reviewing Thomas Paine’s tract The
Age of Reason negatively, and finally naming Paine a “pretender to Common Sense” due to the blunder
he made by writing The Age of Reason).
333. For each of these three Americans, their default to rationalism appears to be inextricably
connected to the French Revolution: PAINE, THE AGE, supra note 332, at 5 (writing during and from
within the French Revolution); 1 ADAMS, A DEFENCE, supra note 305, at 5, 8 (responding to Turgot’s
rationalistic criticisms of American constitutions with rationalism); THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON
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reason should not be deified, because it would be a usurpation of the proper
place of love as the actual image of God.334
Notwithstanding the deep shadows of misogyny, slavery, and terror that
followed the light bringers Adams,335 Jefferson,336 and Paine337
respectively, the independent courts affirmed Adams’s original position.338
In Chisholm v. Georgia, the Court overruled feudalism and upheld the
common sense as the proper fountain of justice.339 Wheatley’s framework
was established as paramount law in Chisholm over the self-betrayals of
Adams, Jefferson, and Paine, in order to assist common law rights in the
United States.340
Those who favor judicial reform, especially after the U.S. Supreme
Court’s recent shadow docket rulings,341 may take courage from this
analysis.342 The independent structure of the United States courts was the

THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 166 (Lilly and Wait 1832) (responding to a French inquiry about Virginia:
“Reason and free enquiry are the only effectual agents against error.”); cf. RUSSELL, UNPOPULAR, supra
note 2, at 33 (“Empiricism, finally, is to be commended not only on the ground of its greater truth, but
also on ethical grounds. Dogma demands authority, rather than intelligent thought, as the source of
opinion; it requires persecution of heretics and hostility to unbelievers; it asks of its disciples that they
should inhibit natural kindliness in favour of systematic hatred.”).
334. Phillis Wheatley, Thoughts on the Works of Providence [1773]. Cf. RUSSELL, UNPOPULAR, supra
note 2, at 148 (“Universal love is an emotion which many have felt and which many more could feel if
the world made it less difficult.”).
335. Letter from John Adams to Abigail Adams (Apr. 14, 1776) (claiming that extending equal
rights to women would “compleatly subject Us [i.e., men generally] to the Despotism of the Peticoat”).
336. JEFFERSON, supra note 333, at 143 (proposing to change the common law of England by
“mak[ing] slaves distributable among the next of kin, as other moveables”).
337. PAINE, THE AGE, supra note 332, at 57–60 (acknowledging the existence of the French
Terror that Paine himself had a hand in causing, without endeavoring to answer any of the important
questions regarding how “the guillotine and the stake outdid the fire and the faggot of the church”—
Robespierre subsumed religion with his cult of reason, and yet even as Paine nearly lost his head
according to this cult, Paine’s faith in reason did not break, but appeared to get even stronger).
338. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 453–54 (1793) (deciding upon “the principles of common
sense” rather than notions of absolute reason).
339. Id. (giving the basis of common sense for the decision); id. at 458 (debunking “the English
maxim, that the King or sovereign is the fountain of Justice”).
340. Id. at 453–54 (relying on Thomas Reid’s exposition of the Ciceronian common sense);
Cicero, De Oratore 1.12 (modelling the common sense pursued by American jurisprudence); cf. Phillis
Wheatley, On Imagination [1773] (resembling Cicero’s thought experiment in Scipio’s Dream); Phillis
Wheatley, On Friendship [1773] (resembling Cicero’s similar focus on friendship as perhaps the ultimate
expression of human love)..
341. See, e.g., Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson, 141 S. Ct. 2494, 2495–96 (2021).
342. See Rachel Maddow, ‘This is a Courts Problem’: Supreme Court Flop on Abortion Law Prompts
Calls for Reform, MSNBC (Sept. 2, 2021), https://www.msnbc.com/rachel-maddow/watch/-this-is-acourts-problem-supreme-court-flop-on-abortion-law-prompts-calls-for-reform-120104005730
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product of Adams’s judicial reform efforts to assist the common law, but it
did not come from the common law.343 Thus, reforming the judiciary is a
founding American tradition, while freezing judicial structures as they were
in 1789 is not.344
CONCLUSION: REMEMBERING THE FLEXIBILITY OF
COMMON LAW DUE PROCESS
Most American lawyers take for granted that the common law established
almost all the ordinary causes of action we know today.345 As Joseph
Story’s Commentaries acknowledged, the common law is the basis of the
entire U.S. system of law.346 Common law struggled with feudal and canon
forms and eventually transformed them for the benefit of ordinary people
even in the face of the most heinous travesties of the English and American
past.347
The Witch Judges of Salem, Massachusetts and the Parliament of Saints
in England did not prevail through despotic radicalism to demolish the
common law through codification.348 Legal positivism always seemed to
spatter large amounts of human blood across the countries that adopted
it.349 There is no rational reason for the people of the United States to re[https://perma.cc/T8RF-V6EF] (addressing the problem of Whole Woman’s Health as a structural issue
for the courts in an interview with U.S. Supreme Court expert Dahlia Lithwick).
343. ADAMS, THE REVOLUTIONARY, supra note 26, at 76–79, 88–89.
344. Id.
345. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *17; BAKER, supra note 223, at 60–64;
BAKER & MILSOM, supra note 224, at 341.
346. 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES §
157 (“The whole structure of our present jurisprudence stands upon the original foundations of the
common law.”).
347. 2 WILSON, supra note 150, at 767 (“The common law, as now received in America, bears,
in its principles, and in many of its more minute particulars, a stronger and a fairer resemblance to the
common law as it was improved under the Saxon, than to that law, as it was disfigured under the
Norman government.”).
348. WOOLRYCH, supra note 267, at 271–73, 300; CHRISTOPHER HILL, GOD’S ENGLISHMAN:
OLIVER CROMWELL AND THE ENGLISH REVOLUTION 171, 273 (1970).
349. See, e.g., HILL, supra note 348, at 171, 273 (the Napoleonic Code, based on the Code
Cromwell Bentham wished for, were developed to oversee times of extreme onslaughts against the
rights of humankind); 4 JEREMY BENTHAM, THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 501 (John Bowring
ed., 1843) (“Behold what was said in his day by Cromwell! In my eyes, it ranks that wonderful man
higher than anything else I ever read of him:—it will not lower him in yours.”); M. DUMONT,
PRINCIPLES OF LEGISLATION: FROM THE MS. OF JEREMY BENTHAM 120, 231–36 (John Neal trans.,
1830) (“If it be better for the greatest happiness of the greatest number that a man should die . . . cut
him [down] without mercy.”) (emphasis added); cf. SCHOFIELD, supra note 267, at 241 (noting that legal
positivism was developed by Bentham in pursuit of his happiness principle, but failing to capture the
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adopt legal positivism to administer rigid formalities that the common law
exists to relieve.350
Due process under the common law is not confusing.351 It is simply due
process under the written law according to the common sense rules for
statutory construction that are confirmed by the test of time.352 But the
common law requires that when rights are taken away, it is not done in
secret, by a dependent political body, or without a jury trial.353 According
to common law if a positive law fails to mention the requirements of due
process, a legitimate court may imply them into the law.354
The founders gave us many clues and shortcuts to apply the common
law, including numerous references to it in the Bill of Rights and United
States Constitution.355 These short cuts are so easy for Americans, that
even our brightest jurists take them for granted and often forget their
origin.356 These jurists are prone to follow the legal realism and positivism

irony of Bentham’s involvement in the French Revolution as a possible cause for the extreme
unhappiness and terror of those times).
350. See, e.g., 2 WILSON, supra note 150, at 767.
351. See JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
§§ 459–61 (citing Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419 (1793)) (explaining how to use the common law to
construe the U.S. Constitution, including due process clauses, by using the objects stated in the
preamble to inform the application of the other provisions of the U.S. Constitution).
352. See JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
§§ 459–61, 1789, 1908, 1941, 1949 (defining the due process clause according to the common law and
stating: “Let us never forget that our constitutions of government are solemn instruments, addressed
to the common sense of the people, and designed to fix and perpetuate their rights and their liberties.
They are not to be frittered away by the demagogues of the day. They are not to be violated to gratify
the ambition of political leaders. They are to speak in the same voice now and forever. They are of no
man’s private interpretation. They are ordained by the will of the people; and can be changed only by
the sovereign command of the people.”).
353. Id.; 3 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES *182–83 (the common law was first tried and
vindicated in the English Civil War, where monopolies and the Star Chamber were abolished in favor
of preexisting rights of life and the adversarial process); Schroeder, Leviathan, supra note 314, at 180
(noting the Council of the North was one of the royal Star Chamber-like courts that eventually caused
the English Civil War by refusing to adhere to the common law mandated by the Statute of
Monopolies).
354. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932) (“When the validity of an act of the Congress is
drawn in question, and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle
that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the
question may be avoided.”). Cf. Dr. Foster’s Case [1616] 11 Co. Rep. 56b, 62a–64b (Eng.)
(demonstrating how to imply preexisting rights into statutes to ensure their constitutionality).
355. U.S. CONST. arts. I–III; U.S. CONST. amends. I–X.
356. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States
Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, THE TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN VALUES 113
(Mar. 8 & 9, 1995) (characterizing the common law as anti-democratic and thereby, apparently,
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of Justice Scalia in the project of rejecting the very common law that brought
our courts into being.357
The Mathews framework for due process especially appeals to these
jurists.358 But as shown above, where Mathews is taken to its final end, it
will consume itself and potentially destroy the very shortcuts to the common
law that made its ruling possible.359 Perhaps it will take losing these
common law shortcuts through Mathews’ self-destruction for American
jurists to realize what is actually at stake in our debates over what process is
due.360
One of the most ironic and absurd characteristics of legal positivists from
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to Justice Antonin Scalia, is that they
never quite figured out how to quit the common law.361 Every so often
they unwittingly embraced a common law rule despite themselves.362 This
fact emphasizes the holes in legal positivist theory, including that it cannot
work but as a parasite upon the common law, because the common law is a
complete fabric of law.363
The common law always seemed to find the cracks in feudal and canon
laws to replant itself like a rose growing from concrete, even if by sheer
unconstitutional by ignoring the several references to the common law in the U.S. Constitution,
especially in the Suspension Clause and the Supremacy Clause).
357. Compare id. at 113, with JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES § 157 (“The whole structure of our present jurisprudence stands upon the original
foundations of the common law.”); id. at § 453 (noting portions of the United States Constitution that
referred directly to the common law).
358. See, e.g., Aleinikoff, supra note 121, at 963 (noting that balancing tests reflect an “up-beat,
‘can-do’ judicial attitude”); June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2120–33 (2020) (plurality
opinion) (applying a balancing test to achieve a presumably liberal result).
359. DHS v. Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. 1959, 1982 (2020) (quoting Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S.
21, 32 (1982)) (citing to the dicta stated in the context of a Mathews cost/benefit balancing decision to
justify the use of anti-immigrant prerogatives).
360. See, e.g., id. at 2015 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (showing how the loss of habeas corpus for
asylum seekers caused Justice Sotomayor to break away from the majority and acknowledge the reality
that the majority opinion was “nothing short of a self-imposed injury to the Judiciary, to the separation
of powers, and to the values embodied in the promise of the Great Writ”).
361. See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40–41 (2001) (creating and developing
common law stare decisis); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 575–76 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing
the majority for engaging in “judicious balancing” which “has no place where the Constitution and the
common law already supply an answer”); Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 91–92 (1923) (vindicating
the common law writ of habeas corpus).
362. See, e.g., Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40–41 (developing the common law in a case of first impression);
Moore, 261 U.S. at 91–92 (vindicating the common law writ of habeas corpus).
363. See Jeffrey D. Goldsworthy, The Self-Destruction of Legal Positivism, 10 OXFORD J.L. STUD.
449, 471–72 (1990).
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human imagination.364 Let us, therefore, not despair.365 Rather, let us
water the cracks in the concrete and scatter seeds in unlikely places as
well,366 because something new may be formulating in the darkness below,
preparing to break into the light, to give new life to the law in America.367

364. Tupac Shakur, The Rose that Grew from Concrete [1999]. Compare 2 WILSON, supra note 150,
at 767, with Phillis Wheatley, On Imagination [1773], and HOBBES, supra note 2, at 3–13 (discussing
imagination).
365. Phillis Wheatley, On Virtue [1773]; FLANNERY O’CONNOR, A PRAYER JOURNAL 22
(2013).
366. Cf. Tupac Shakur, The Rose that Grew from Concrete [1999] (providing an example of the talent
that can spring up from unlikely places).
367. Frederick FREDERICK DOUGLASS, What to the Slave is the 4th of July? (July 5, 1852), in
ORATION DELIVERED IN CORINTHIAN HALL, ROCHESTER 38 (1852)(“The fiat of the Almighty, ‘Let
there be Light,’ has not yet spent its force.”); cf. Phillis Wheatley, To the Rev. Dr. Thomas Amory on Reading
His Sermons on Daily Devotion, in which that Duty is Recommended and Assisted [1773] (“In vain would Vice
her works in night conceal, For Wisdom’s eye pervades the sable veil.”); Phillis Wheatley, Ocean [1773]
(showing us a prospect of creation of light out of darkness).
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